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Abstract. We consider a stochastic tournament game in which each player is rewarded based
on her rank in terms of the completion time of her own task and is subject to cost of effort.
When players are homogeneous and the rewards are purely rank dependent, the equilibrium
has a surprisingly explicit characterization, which allows us to conduct comparative statics
and obtain explicit solution to several optimal reward design problems. In the general case
when the players are heterogenous and payoffs are not purely rank dependent, we prove
the existence, uniqueness and stability of the Nash equilibrium of the associated mean field
game, and the existence of an approximate Nash equilibrium of the finite-player game. Our
results have some potential economic implications; e.g., they lend support to government
subsidies for R&D, assuming the profits to be made are substantial.
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1 Introduction
To put our mathematical problem of a large population tournament into a real life con-
text, consider the pre-Google time when a lot of players were competing to build a successful
internet search engine. This is a game in which the future reward depends mostly on which
player would come up first with a superior product, and not so much on the actual date
of the invention. This is the type of tournament games we mostly focus on in this paper:
many players with the rewards depending only on the ranking of the times needed to com-
plete a task, in which the progress is gradual rather than sudden. Examples include: a
population of the same generation in a country, with each player trying to attain the most
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advanced preparation for their future career in the shortest amount of time; a population of
entrepreneurs during the same boom period working on getting their product or start-up to
the last stage of development; more generally, it includes the racing type of competitions in
which the progress is attained gradually.
We formulate the large population tournament as a mean field game – a stochastic game
with infinitely many small players interacting through their aggregate distribution, intro-
duced by Lasry and Lions (2006a,b, 2007), and Huang et al. (2006, 2007). The advantage of
the mean field formulation is that the equilibrium has an appealing decentralized structure:
each player bases her decisions on her own state variable and a deterministic measure of
completion time distribution that is obtained from the solution of a fixed point problem.
One can then use the mean field game solution to construct an approximate Nash equilib-
rium of the finite-player game. Apart from our application to the analysis of tournaments,
mean field games have been applied to macroeconomics by Achdou et al. (2014), analysis of
bank runs by Carmona et al. (2017), systemic risk by Carmona et al. (2015), and analysis
of queueing systems with strategic servers by Bayraktar et al. (2017). We also refer to the
works of Gue´ant et al. (2011), Bensoussan et al. (2013) and Carmona and Delarue (2018a,b)
for further reading.
What sets our set-up apart from the above is the rank-based feature of our problem:
players are rewarded according to how their completion times, which will be modeled as
hitting times of controlled diffusions, are ranked. (Each player also has a cost of effort:
i.e., she pays a cost for influencing the drift of her own diffusion.) Mean field games with
rank-based features are generally difficult to analyze due to the lack of a priori regularity of
the rank function that depends on the equilibrium. Except for the terminal position ranking
game of Bayraktar and Zhang (2016) and the one-stage Poisson game of Nutz and Zhang
(2017), one can usually only hope for abstract existence under the weak formulation as in
(Carmona and Lacker, 2015, Example 5.9). Hence one of the contributions of our work is the
construction of a solvable mean field model, which is rare outside the classical linear-quadratic
framework. Moreover, even in the general setup without an explicit solution, we are still
able to handle reward functions that are discontinuous in the rank variable. A key ingredient
to our analysis is recognizing that the optimally controlled state density is a distortion of
the density of Brownian motion by a factor related to the Cole-Hopf transformation of the
value function. Particle systems with rank-based interaction, but no strategic actions, have
been widely studied in the literature; see e.g. Shkolnikov (2012), Ichiba et al. (2013) and the
references therein. A recent paper by Nadtochiy and Shkolnikov (2017) considers particles
interacting through hitting times and presents applications in the analysis of systemic risk.
In economics, the analysis of tournaments goes back to the seminal paper of Lazear and Rosen
(1981), which has inspired many papers that followed, including Akerlof and Holden (2012),
Balafoutas et al. (2017), Olszewski and Siegel (2017) and Fang et al. (2018), among the more
recent ones. Most of these works focus on finitely many players or static models. Recently,
there has been active research on models in which the randomness is driven by Poisson ar-
rivals, and the player’s effort affects the probability of a breakthrough; see e.g. Bimpikis et al.
(2018), Halac et al. (2017) and Nutz and Zhang (2017). Those models are aimed more at
applications to R&D with sudden innovation breakthroughs, whereas our model is more
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appropriate for the cases in which the progress is incremental.
In our model, when the players are homogeneous in their starting point and efficiency
(i.e. cost of effort), and the reward function is purely rank-based (except for the dependence
on a given deadline), we find that the equilibrium has a semi-explicit formula. This enables
us to analyze some interesting comparative statics. In particular, we find that the aggregate
welfare may be increasing in the cost of effort. This indicates, for example, that for an econ-
omy in which building a start-up is a relatively complex endeavor, the complexity may not be
such a bad thing – if it was less complex, too many entrepreneurs may put in an inefficiently
high effort. We also find that, when the total pie is sufficiently large, high inequality in the
rewards has a demoralizing effect for many players, a phenomenon emphasized in Fang et al.
(2018). However, in our model, when the pie is sufficiently small, the higher prize inequality
improves the welfare and the average effort to a certain extent. This is because there is now
an effect that decreases competitiveness – a higher percentage of players give up, and as the
rewards become more uneven it is worthwhile for the players who do not give up to exert
higher effort. This effect cannot arise in the setup of Fang et al. (2018) in which the size of
the pie is directly influenced by the effort.1 In the example of internet search engines (or
social media sites, or computer operating systems) the total pie is large, but the rewards
are uneven, suggesting that there is loss of efficiency in that many players get discouraged
from applying effort. This logic lends some support to having government subsidies, e.g.,
for R&D in renewable energy, if those subsidies make the rewards more even, assuming the
profits to be made are substantial.
Having a semi-explicit equilibrium also allows us to tackle the problem of mechanism
design, an area that has not been widely explored in the mean field game literature due to
the lack of tractability. Similar to Elie et al. (2016) and Nutz and Zhang (2017), we also
work with Stackelberg equilibrium: the principal or social planner acts as the leader and
designs the reward first, and the agents act as followers who then form a Nash equilibrium
within themselves.
We also consider an extension of the benchmark model where the total reward, the “pie”,
may depend on the population completion rate, as in institutions in which the wealth created
by production increases with the completion rate of individual tasks. In the extreme case
where the reward is independent of rank and increasing in the completion rate, our game
is a contribution game in which the interaction is not through the aggregate effort towards
a single project as in, for example, Georgiadis (2015), but through the completion rate of
many parallel projects. It turns out that, with a completion rate-dependent pie, there may be
multiple equilibria all of which can be characterized in a semi-explicit manner. Furthermore,
by interpolating between a pure contribution game and a pure competition game, we are
able to draw a bifurcation diagram of the equilibria.
While we do not have an explicit characterization of equilibrium when the players are
heterogeneous or when the reward function is not purely rank-based, we prove its exis-
tence using Schauder or Brouwer’s fixed point theorems, and uniqueness under an additional
1See Section 3.5, however, for a discussion of this effect in the case in which the size of the pie depends
on the completion rate.
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monotonicity condition. We also show the stability of the fixed point, which enables us to
approximate the mean field equilibrium by the solution to a finite dimensional system of
nonlinear equations. Finally, we construct an approximate equilibrium for a game with a
large finite number of players from the mean field equilibrium.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: we present the model in Section 2; the
results for homogeneous players, including comparative statics, optimal reward design and
extension to the completion rate-dependent pie in Section 3; general existence, uniqueness,
stability and the approximation to finite-player games in Section 4; and a numerical example
with heterogeneous players in Section 5; the numerical method and some minor proofs are
provided in Appendix.
2 Model setup
We consider a game with a large number of independent players, in which each player
can exert effort to move her project forward, and is rewarded based on the time needed
to complete the project and/or the ranking of that time relative to other players. The
completion time is modeled as the first time that her project value or progress process
reach a target level normalized to level zero. The tournament ends when a given deadline
T ∈ (0,∞] is reached. The total amount of the reward, or the “pie”, is fixed for now,
although we extend in Section 3.5 some of our results to a pie that depends on the terminal
completion rate, i.e. the percentage of players who manage to meet the deadline. The reader
can have in mind a population of technology firms competing to build a new app/website
where the reward depends on the relative time of completing a superior product (as in the
search engines example from Introduction). More generally, our setup might include cases in
which the players derive utility from their ranking relative to their peers, even if the ranking
is not rewarded by a monetary payment.
The reward a player gets for finishing at time t with rank r is given by a bounded function
R(t, r) : R+ × [0, 1] 7→ R. We assume R is decreasing in both variables.2 When T <∞, we
also impose R(t, r) ≡ R∞ for all t > T so that everyone who fails to complete her project
by the deadline receives the same minimum participation reward or incompletion penalty.
Denote the set of reward functions by R. We start by assuming an infinite population of
players, and later study how well it approximates a finite population in the limit.
2.1 A single player’s problem
The optimization problem of a single player, in an infinite population of players, is given
as follows. Denote by µ ∈ P(R+) the distribution of the completion times of the population,
and by Fµ its cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.). The rank of the single player who
finishes at time t is given by Fµ(t), as this is the fraction of players who finish before or at
2Throughout the paper, increasing and decreasing are understood in the weak sense.
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the same time as her.3
Let Rµ(t) := R(t, Fµ(t)), which is then a bounded and decreasing function of t. We
assume the player is risk-neutral and has quadratic cost, and that her state process X ,
representing her distance to completion, follows the stochastic differential equation (SDE)
dXs = −asds+ σdBs, (2.1)
where B is a Brownian motion. The player’s effort process a is admissible if it is non-
negative, progressively measurable with respect to the filtration of B,4 and yields a unique
strong solution of (2.1) up to the first passage time to level zero, and if that time is non-
atomic.5 Thus, the optimization problem of the single player has the value function
v(t, x) = v(t, x;µ, c) := sup
a
E
[
Rµ(τ)−
∫ τ∧T
t
ca2sds
∣∣∣∣Xt = x] , (2.2)
where c > 0 is the cost parameter and τ = inf{s ≥ t : Xs = 0} is the completion time.
While we assume no discounting for tractability, it can be interpreted as the case in which
the cost of effort and the reward increase exactly at the same rate at which the discount
factor decreases. For example, the salaries in a certain profession increase over time, as does
the cost of education and job searching. If those increases are exactly offset by the players’
discount factor, the value function is as above.6
For any y 6= 0, denote by τ ◦y the first passage time of a Brownian motion to level y. Its
density is well known and given by (see, e.g., page 197 of Karatzas and Shreve (1991))
fτ◦y (s) =
|y|
s
√
2πs
exp
(
−y
2
2s
)
, s > 0. (2.3)
Also introduce
u(t, x) = u(t, x;µ, c) := E
[
exp
(
Rµ(t + τ
◦
x/σ)
2cσ2
)]
= E
[
exp
(
Rµ(t+
x2
σ2
τ ◦1 )
2cσ2
)]
. (2.4)
We have the following result.
Proposition 2.1. The value function v(t, x) of the single player’s problem is given by
v(t, x) = 2cσ2 ln(u(t, x)).
There exists an optimal (Markovian/feedback) action a∗ that attains v(t, x), given by
a∗(t, x) = − 1
2c
vx(t, x)1{x>0} = −σ2ux(t, x)
u(t, x)
1{x>0}.
3In our game, µ will be non-atomic, hence whether the rank is measured using Fµ(t) or Fµ(t−) does not
matter.
4The filtration can be larger; see Remark 2.2.
5The non-atomic condition is for technical reasons, and can be removed if Rµ is lower semi-continuous
for all µ ∈ P(R+), which will be the case in our examples.
6We can also consider the case in which the reward may decrease with the interval in which completion
occurs; see Remark 3.2.
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The corresponding completion time τ ∗ = τ ∗,t,x is non-atomic and has probability density
function (p.d.f.)
fτ∗(s) =
u(s, 0)
u(t, x)
fτ◦
x/σ
(s− t), s ≥ t. (2.5)
Proof. Let u be defined by (2.4), v := 2cσ2 ln u and a∗ := −vx/(2c)1{x>0} = −σ2(ux/u)1{x>0}.
Step 1. Show that v is a solution to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation:
vt + sup
a
{
−avx + 1
2
σ2vxx − ca2
}
= 0, (2.6)
with boundary condition v(t, 0) = Rµ(t) for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , and when T <∞, also the terminal
condition v(T, x) = R∞ = Rµ(T+) for x > 0.
By the first order condition, (2.6) is equivalent to
vt +
1
4c
(vx)
2 +
1
2
σ2vxx = 0,
where the supremum is attained by a∗ pointwise. To show v is a solution to the above
equation with the desired boundary and terminal conditions, it is equivalent to show its
Cole-Hopf transformation u = e(2cσ
2)−1v satisfies
ut +
1
2
σ2uxx = 0, (2.7)
with
u(t, 0) = exp
(
Rµ(t)
2cσ2
)
, u(T, x) = exp
(
R∞
2cσ2
)
if T <∞.
But this is immediate from the Feynman-Kac theorem.
Step 2. Show that the SDE (2.1) controlled by a∗ ≥ 0 has a unique strong solution
X∗(= X∗,t,x) up to τ ∗(= τ ∗,t,x), the first passage time of X∗ to level zero.
By the monotonicity and boundedness of Rµ, u is decreasing in both t and x, and
exp
(
R∞
2cσ2
)
≤ u(t, x) ≤ exp
(
R(0, 0)
2cσ2
)
. (2.8)
Since τ ◦1 has a smooth density, even if Rµ is not continuous, it is not hard to see that
u ∈ C1,2(R+ × (0,∞)). In fact, direct differentiation of (2.4) yields
ux(t, x) =
1
x
E
[
exp
(
Rµ(t+
x2
σ2
τ ◦1 )
2cσ2
)(
1− 1
τ ◦1
)]
,
and
uxx(t, x) =
1
x2
E
[
exp
(
Rµ(t+
x2
σ2
τ ◦1 )
2cσ2
)(
1
(τ ◦1 )
2
− 3
τ ◦1
)]
.
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Note that 1/τ ◦1 has finite moments.
7 So ux and uxx are bounded on any region away from
x = 0. It follows that a∗ is bounded, and Lipschitz continuous in x on any compact subset
of (0,∞). Standard SDE theory then implies the existence of a unique strong solution up
to τ ∗.
Step 3. Show that τ ∗ is non-atomic and has the desired p.d.f. (2.5).
We employ a change of probability measure argument. Let B◦ be a Brownian motion
under some probability measure P◦. Define Xs := x+ σ(B
◦
s −B◦t ) and τ := inf{s ≥ t : Xs =
0}. Let u be the function given by (2.4). Define
Zs :=
u(s ∧ τ,Xs∧τ)
u(t, x)
.
We have Zt = 1 and that the paths of Z are P
◦-a.s. continuous. To see the latter, observe
that if Rµ(s) is continuous at s = τ(ω), then lims→τ(ω) Zs = exp
(
Rµ(τ(ω))
2cσ2
)
/u(t, x) = Zτ(ω).
Since Rµ is decreasing, it has at most countably many points of discontinuity. Since τ is
non-atomic under P◦, with P◦-probability one, Rµ(s) is continuous at s = τ , and thus, the
s 7→ Zs is continuous at s = τ . Path continuity before time τ is trivial.
By Itoˆ’s lemma,
dZs =
{
σux(s,Xs)
u(t,x)
dB◦s , t ≤ s < τ,
0, s ≥ τ,
where the drift of Z prior to time τ is killed using (2.7). Since Z is bounded, it is a P◦-
martingale. Hence we can define a probability measure P via dP/dP◦ = Z∞ = Zτ . Since Zτ
is strictly positive, P is equivalent to P◦.
Next, we rewrite the dynamics of Z as dZs = ZsdYs where
dYs =
{
σux
u
(s,Xs)dB
◦
s , t ≤ s < τ.
0, s ≥ τ.
We see that Z is the stochastic exponential of Y . (We could set Zs ≡ 1 and dYs ≡ 0 for
s < t if necessary.) Girsanov Theorem implies that
Bs := B
◦
s − 1{s≥t}
∫ s∧τ
t
σux
u
(r,Xr)dr
is a P-Brownian motion. Replacing B◦ by B in the dynamics of X , we obtain
dXs = σ
2ux
u
(s,Xs)1{s<τ}ds+ σdBs = −a∗(s,Xs)ds+ σdBs, s ≥ t.
7The moments of 1/τ◦1 can be computed using
P (1/τ◦1 ≥ t) = P (τ◦1 ≤ 1/t) = 2P (W (1/t) ≥ 1) = 2
∫ ∞
√
t
1√
2π
e−z
2/2dz,
and E[(1/τ◦1 )
p] =
∫∞
0
ptp−1P (1/τ◦1 ≥ t)dt. In particular, we have E[1/τ◦1 ] = 1 and E[(1/τ◦1 )2] = 3.
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That is, X has the same distribution under P as the process X∗ under the candidate optimal
effort a∗. Under P, we have
P(τ ∈ ds) = u(s, 0)
u(t, x)
P
◦(τ ∈ ds), s ≥ t,
from which we conclude that τ (and hence τ ∗) is non-atomic and has the desired p.d.f.
Step 4. Verify that v is indeed the value function and that a∗ is indeed the optimal effort.
The verification argument is standard except for an extra localization step to take care of
the potential singularity of vx near x = 0. Specifically, fixing an arbitrary admissible control
a and the associated state process X , we apply Itoˆ’s lemma to v(s,Xs) from time t to τε∧T ,
where ε > 0 and τε := {s ≥ t : Xs = ε}. This leads to
Ev(τε ∧ T,Xτε∧T ) = v(t, x) + E
∫ τε∧T
t
(
vt(s,Xs)− asvx(s,Xs) + 1
2
σ2vxx(s,Xs)
)
ds
≤ v(t, x) + E
∫ τε∧T
t
ca2sds,
where the inequality holds because v satisfies the HJB equation (2.6). It follows that
v(t, x) ≥ Ev(τε ∧ T,Xτε∧T )−E
∫ τε∧T
t
ca2sds. (2.9)
Now, as εց 0, since τε is increasing and bounded by inf{s ≥ t : x+σ(Bs−Bt) = 0}, it has a
limit τ0 ≤ τ := inf{s ≥ t : Xs = 0}. We claim that τ0 = τ . Indeed, if Xτ0 > 0, then by path
continuity, ε = Xτε > δ for some δ > 0, for all ε sufficiently small, which is a contradiction.
By monotone convergence theorem, E
∫ τε∧T
t
ca2sds converges to E
∫ τ∧T
t
ca2sds as εց 0. To
obtain the limit of Ev(τε∧T,Xτε∧T ), note that τε∧T → τ ∧T and Xτε∧T → Xτ∧T . If τ > T ,
then Xτ∧T = XT > 0, and v(τε ∧ T,Xτε∧T )→ v(T,XT ) = R∞ = Rµ(τ) by the continuity of
v in R+× (0,∞). If τ ≤ T , then Xτ∧T = Xτ = 0, and v(τε∧T,Xτε∧T )→ v(τ, 0) = Rµ(τ) if τ
is a continuity point of Rµ. Since Rµ has at most countably many points of discontinuity (by
monotonicity) and τ is non-atomic by admissibility, we have, after combining the two cases,
that v(τε ∧ T,Xτε∧T ) converges to Rµ(τ) a.s.8 Bounded convergence theorem then implies
Ev(τε ∧ T,Xτε∧T )→ ERµ(τ). So, letting εց 0 in (2.9) yields
v(t, x) ≥ E
[
Rµ(τ)−
∫ τ∧T
t
ca2sds
]
.
Since a is an arbitrary admissible control, taking supremum over a leads to the conclusion
that v dominates the value function.
Replacing a by a∗ which is admissible by Steps 2 and 3, all inequalities above become
equalities, which implies that v(t, x) = E
[
Rµ(τ
∗)− ∫ τ∗∧T
t
c(a∗(s,X∗s ))
2ds
]
is dominated by
the value function. Putting everything together, we conclude the verification proof.
8If Rµ is lower semi-continuous, then we can directly obtain lim infε v(τε ∧ T,Xτε∧T ) ≥ Rµ(τ) without
the non-atomic property of τ .
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Remark 2.1. One can also obtain (2.5) via an analytic argument. To see this, note that
the Fokker-Planck equation
ρs(s, y) = [a
∗(s, y)ρy(s, y)]y +
1
2
σ2ρyy(s, y), ρ(t, y) = δx(y)
with absorbing boundary condition ρ(s, 0) = 0 has a semi-explicit solution
ρ(s, y) =
u(s, y)
u(t, x)
ϕ(s, y),
where ϕ is the solution to
ϕs =
1
2
σ2ϕyy, ϕ(t, y) = δx(y), ϕ(s, 0) = 0.
From this, one can derive (2.5) by repeated integration by parts:
P(τ ∈ ds) = − d
ds
P(τ > s) = − d
ds
∫ ∞
0
ρ(s, y)dy = −
∫ ∞
0
ρs(s, y)dy
= − 1
u(t, x)
∫ ∞
0
(usϕ+ uϕs)(s, y)dy
= − σ
2
2u(t, x)
∫ ∞
0
(−uyyϕ+ uϕyy)(s, y)dy
=
σ2
2u(t, x)
u(s, 0)ϕy(s, 0)
and
P
◦(τ ∈ ds) = −
∫ ∞
0
ϕs(s, y)dy = −1
2
σ2
∫ ∞
0
ϕyy(s, y)dy =
1
2
σ2ϕy(s, 0).
Remark 2.2. From the the verification step of the proof of Proposition 2.1, it is not hard
to see that the feedback control a∗ remains optimal if admissible controls are progressively
measurable with respect to a filtration larger than the one generated by the driving Brownian
motion B, as long as B remains a Brownian motion for that filtration. Later we will use
this fact in the construction of an approximate Nash equilibrium for the N-player game in
which each player observes not only her private state, but also the states of her competitors.
Having computed the best response of a single player to a given distribution µ, we are
now ready to study the Nash equilibrium of this infinite population game. Supposing every
player uses the optimal feedback control a∗ = a∗(·;µ, c) given by Propsition 2.1, we obtain
a new population completion time distribution. If this new distribution is equal to µ, then
we say µ is an equilibrium (completion time distribution). We first consider a case in which
equilibrium can be fully characterized in Section 3, and then discuss the general case in
Section 4.
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3 Homogeneous players
In this section, we assume a unit mass of homogeneous players with independent Brownian
motions driving their state processes. By homogeneous, we mean the players all start playing
at the same time t = 0 and the same distance x0 > 0 from the goal, and they all have the
same cost parameter c. Moreover, we specialize to the purely rank-based reward functions
of the form
R(t, r) = 1{t≤T}H(r) + 1{t>T}R∞, (3.1)
where H ≥ R∞ is a bounded decreasing function. That is, the only time dependence is
through the deadline T . We will show below that there always exists a unique equilibrium in
semi-explicit form. The proof is based on considering equation (2.5) as a fixed point equation
for the p.d.f. of the population completion time.
3.1 Explicit characterization and properties of the equilibrium
Denote by T µr the r-th quantile of a completion time distribution µ, and by N(x) the
c.d.f. of the standard normal distribution. We have the following results.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose that R ∈ R is of the form (3.1).
(i) For T < ∞, the unique equilibrium completion time distribution µ has a quantile
function given by
T µr = F
−1
τ◦
x0/σ
(
1− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )
1− Fµ(T )
∫ r
0
exp
(
R∞ −H(z)
2cσ2
)
dz
)
, r ∈ [0, Fµ(T )], (3.2)
where
Fτ◦
x0/σ
(t) = 2
(
1−N
(
x0
σ
√
t
))
, (3.3)
and the equilibrium terminal completion rate Fµ(T ) ∈ (0, 1) is the unique solution of
Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T ) =
1− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )
1− Fµ(T )
∫ Fµ(T )
0
exp
(
R∞ −H(z)
2cσ2
)
dz. (3.4)
Moreover, the value of the game is given by
V = v(0, x0;µ, c) = R∞ + 2cσ
2 ln
(
1− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )
1− Fµ(T )
)
. (3.5)
(ii) For T = ∞, the unique equilibrium completion time distribution µ has a quantile
function given by
T µr = F
−1
τ◦
x0/σ
∫ r0 exp
(
−H(z)
2cσ2
)
dz∫ 1
0
exp
(
−H(z)
2cσ2
)
dz
 . (3.6)
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Moreover, the value of the game is given by
V∞ = v(0, x0;µ, c) = −2cσ2 ln
(∫ 1
0
exp
(
−H(z)
2cσ2
)
dz
)
. (3.7)
Proof. (i) Suppose T < ∞. By (2.5), the fixed point equation (in terms of the p.d.f. of the
completion time distribution) is
fµ(t) =
u(t, 0;µ, c)
u(0, x0;µ, c)
fτ◦
x0/σ
(t), t ∈ [0, T ].
Denote y(r) = Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T µr ). Since any fixed point µ has positive density on [0, T ], y(r) is
differentiable on [0, Fµ(T )] with
y′(r) =
fτ◦
x0/σ
(T µr )
fµ(T
µ
r )
=
u(0, x0;µ, c)
u(T µr , 0;µ, c)
=
∫ T
0
exp
(
H(Fµ(s))
2cσ2
)
dFτ◦
x0/σ
(s) + exp
(
R∞
2cσ2
)
(1− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T ))
exp
(
H(Fµ(T
µ
r ))
2cσ2
)
=
∫ Fµ(T )
0
exp
(
H(z)
2cσ2
)
y′(z)dz + exp
(
R∞
2cσ2
)
(1− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T ))
exp
(
H(r)
2cσ2
) .
Observe that exp
(
H(r)
2cσ2
)
y′(r) is independent of r, hence is constant for r ∈ [0, Fµ(T )]. Let
C be this constant. We have
C = CFµ(T ) + exp
(
R∞
2cσ2
)
(1− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )).
Since Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T ) < 1, the above equation implies Fµ(T ) < 1 and
exp
(
H(r)
2cσ2
)
y′(r) ≡ C =
1− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )
1− Fµ(T ) exp
(
R∞
2cσ2
)
, r ∈ [0, Fµ(T )].
It follows that
y(r) =
1− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )
1− Fµ(T )
∫ r
0
exp
(
R∞ −H(z)
2cσ2
)
dz, r ∈ [0, Fµ(T )].
Setting r = Fµ(T ) yields equation (3.4) for Fµ(T ). The existence and uniqueness of solution
follows from the fact that
φ(r) :=
1
1− r
∫ r
0
exp
(
R∞ −H(z)
2cσ2
)
dz (3.8)
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is a continuous, strictly increasing function on [0, 1) satisfying φ(0) = 0 and limr→1 φ(r) =∞.
Finally, we have v(0, x0;µ, c) = 2cσ
2 ln u(0, x0;µ, c) and
u(0, x0;µ, c) = CFµ(T ) + exp
(
R∞
2cσ2
)
(1− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )) =
1− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )
1− Fµ(T ) exp
(
R∞
2cσ2
)
from which (3.5) follows.
(ii) Suppose T = ∞. First, note that any possible fixed point µ should have strictly
increasing c.d.f. which satisfies Fµ(∞) = 1 since the effort is non-negative and the first
passage time of a Brownian motion is almost surely finite. Let y(r) be defined as above. A
similar calculation shows that
exp
(
H(r)
2cσ2
)
y′(r) =
∫ 1
0
exp
(
H(z)
2cσ2
)
y′(z)dz
is constant (denoted by C) and
Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T µr ) = y(r) = C
∫ r
0
exp
(
−H(z)
2cσ2
)
dz.
We can then use y(1) = 1 to find that C =
(∫ 1
0
exp
(
−H(z)
2cσ2
)
dz
)−1
. Having obtained y(r),
we have T µr = F
−1
τ◦
x0/σ
(y(r)). The equilibrium value is v(0, x0;µ, c) = 2cσ
2 ln u(0, x0;µ, c) =
2cσ2 lnC.
Remark 3.1. Observe that the finite horizon equilibrium converges to the infinite horizon
equilibrium as T →∞. To see this, use (3.4) to rewrite the finite horizon equilibrium quantile
function and value of the game as
T µr (T ) = F
−1
τ◦
x0/σ
 ∫ r0 exp
(
R∞−H(z)
2cσ2
)
dz∫ Fµ(T )
0
exp
(
R∞−H(z)
2cσ2
)
dz
Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )
 , r ∈ [0, Fµ(T )]
and
V (T ) = R∞ + 2cσ
2 ln
 Fτ◦x0/σ(T )∫ Fµ(T )
0
exp
(
R∞−H(z)
2cσ2
)
dz
 = 2cσ2 ln
 Fτ◦x0/σ(T )∫ Fµ(T )
0
exp
(
−H(z)
2cσ2
)
dz
 .
As T →∞, Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )/(1−Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T ))→∞. For (3.4) to hold, we must have limT→∞ Fµ(T ) =
1. It follows that the finite horizon equilibrium T µr (T ) and V (T ) converge to their infinite
horizon counterparts as T →∞, where the convergence is pointwise for the quantile function.
Remark 3.2. More generally, if R ∈ R is of the form
R(t, r) =
n∑
k=1
1{Tk−1<t≤Tk}δkH(r) + 1{t>T}R∞,
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where 0 = T0 < T1 < · · · < Tn = T < ∞, then with αk := Fτ◦
x0/σ
(Tk) and βk := Fµ(Tk), the
equilibrium quantile function is given by
T µr = F
−1
τ◦
x0/σ
(
1− αn
1 − βn
n∑
k=1
∫ βk∧r
βk−1∧r
exp
(
R∞ − δkH(z)
2cσ2
)
dz
)
, r ∈ [0, βn],
where β1, . . . , βn can be found by solving the following nonlinear system of equations:
αk − αk−1 = 1− αn
1 − βn
∫ βk
βk−1
exp
(
R∞ − δkH(z)
2cσ2
)
dz, k = 1, . . . , n.
The game value in this case is V = R∞+2cσ
2 ln
(
1−αn
1−βn
)
. Similarly, a semi-explicit formula
can be derived for the case T =∞.
The semi-explicit solution allows us to obtain some comparative statics analytically. The
proof is based on elementary calculus and is provided in the appendix.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose that R ∈ R is of the form (3.1) with H continuous. Then, the
terminal equilibrium completion rate β := Fµ(T ) and the game value V (written as V∞ when
T =∞) have the following properties.
(i) When T <∞, β is increasing in T and decreasing in x0 and c, where the monotonicity
in T and x0 are strict. Moreover,
lim
T→0
β = 0, lim
T→∞
β = 1, lim
x0→0
β = 1, lim
x0→∞
β = 0, lim
c→0
β = 1, lim
c→∞
β = Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T ).
(ii) When T <∞, V is increasing in T and decreasing in x0. Moreover,
lim
T→0
V = R∞, lim
T→∞
V = V∞, lim
x0→0
V = V∞, lim
x0→∞
V = R∞.
(iii) V∞ is independent of x0, and increasing in c with
lim
c→0
V∞ = H(1−), 9 lim
c→∞
V∞ =
∫ 1
0
H(r)dr.
(iv) If H1 ≥ H2, then V∞(H1) ≥ V∞(H2). When T < ∞ and Ri = 1{t≤T}Hi + 1{t>T}Ri,∞,
if H1 − R1,∞ ≥ H2 −R2,∞, then β(R1) ≥ β(R2) and V (R1)− R1,∞ ≥ V (R2)−R2,∞.
The results in items (i), (ii) and (iv) are intuitive and not surprising. Somewhat surpris-
ing, at first sight, might be the fact stated in (iii) that the value V∞ of the infinite horizon
game is increasing in the cost parameter c. Let us consider the limiting cases. When the
cost goes to zero, all the players will apply very high effort and the value will converge to
the value H(1) (if H is left-continuous at 1) of the lowest ranked player. On the other hand,
9H(r−) denotes the left limit of H at r. The one-sided limit exists because H is bounded and monotone.
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when the cost goes to infinity, they will apply very small effort and the project values be
driven by pure noise, which results in an aggregate gain of
∫∞
0
H(Fµ(t))dFµ(t) =
∫ 1
0
H(r)dr,
where the equilibrium measure µ is distributed as τ ◦x0/σ in the limit. Since H is decreasing,
the averaged value is higher than H(1).
In effect, low cost incentivizes players to apply too much effort in competing with each
other, without resulting in good ranking. It’s a rat race without winners. For the aggregate
welfare it does not matter which of the players finish early, and competing too hard with
each other to reach the goal sooner decreases the welfare. Thus, in this game it is beneficial
if the players are discouraged from working too hard by having a high cost of effort. For
example, if building a start-up was too easy, too many entrepreneurs may apply too high
effort. However,with a finite deadline, as we will see in the next subsection, the effect of the
cost on the value may be increasing or decreasing. Moreover, if the pie was not fixed, but,
for example, if it grew with the population completion rate and the speed of completion,
then lower cost may lead to higher value.
We end the theoretical analysis with a result on the expected total effort, needed later
below for further comparative statics.
Proposition 3.2. Let T <∞. Suppose that R ∈ R is of the form (3.1). Let µ be the unique
equilibrium completion time distribution given by Theorem 3.1(i), and a∗t := a
∗(t, Xt;µ, c),
X, τ be the associated equilibrium action, state process and completion time, respectively.
Then, the expected total effort in equilibrium is given by
E
∫ τ∧T
0
a∗tdt =
x0
(
Fµ(T )− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )
)
1− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )
. (3.9)
Proof. From Xτ∧T = x0 −
∫ τ∧T
0
a∗tdt+ σBτ∧T , we get
E
∫ τ∧T
0
a∗tdt = x0 − EXτ∧T .
To compute EXτ∧T , we make use of the change of measure introduced in the proof of
Proposition 2.1. Let P◦ and Z∞ as in step 3 of the proof of Proposition 2.1 with (t, x) =
(0, x0). We have
EXτ∧T = E[1{τ>T}XT ] = E
P
◦
[Z∞1{τ>T}XT ]
= EP
◦
[
u(τ,Xτ ;µ, c)
u(0, x0;µ, c)
1{τ>T}XT
]
= EP
◦
[
exp
(
R∞
2cσ2
)
u(0, x0;µ, c)
1{τ>T}XT
]
=
exp
(
R∞
2cσ2
)
u(0, x0;µ, c)
EP
◦
Xτ∧T
Since X is a martingale under P◦, we have EP
◦
Xτ∧T = x0. By Theorem 3.1(i),
u(0, x0;µ, c) = exp
(
v(0, x0;µ, c)
2cσ2
)
=
1− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )
1− Fµ(T ) exp
(
R∞
2cσ2
)
.
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Putting all pieces together, we have
E
∫ τ∧T
0
a∗tdt = x0 −
1− Fµ(T )
1− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )
x0 =
x0
(
Fµ(T )− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )
)
1− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )
.
We see that the expected total effort increases with the completion rate Fµ(T ) when
x0, σ, T are fixed. Since Fµ(T ) decreases with c, so does the expected total effort.
3.2 The finite deadline: numerical comparative statics
We now perform a numerical study of the equilibrium in games with a finite deadline.
The benchmark choice of model inputs are T = 1, σ = 0.25, x0 = 1, c = 1 and R∞ = 0.
Whenever we vary one parameter, we keep the other parameters fixed.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate some features of the equilibrium with a smooth reward function
H(r) = 6(1−r)2, and a step reward function H(r) = 5 ·1[0,0.25)(r)+2 ·1[0.25,0.5)(r)+1[0.5,1](r),
respectively. We can see the following:
• For a large subset of time-location pairs (t, x), the effort is low. The effort is high
initially when there are a lot of players around the same level of progress, and close to
the cutoff dates that distinguish between different rank rewards (the only such cutoff
date being the deadline in the case of a smooth reward). Thus in Figure 2, there is, for
example, a lot of completion in the short interval before Fµ hits 0.25 because 0.25 is
the cutoff point for a higher reward. Once that point is crossed, the players apply low
effort until getting close to the next cutoff point, so that the completion rate increases
very slowly in the period between a cutoff point and close to the next cutoff point.
• Moreover, the effort is very low (but not zero) when it is hard to complete the task due
to distant location or high cost, or when the reward too small. In those cases (figures
not shown) we find that the players maintain a low effort, relying on randomness of
the project to bring them closer to completion, which happens with low probability.
• The c.d.f of the completion time for early times is close to, but not exactly equal to
zero, because some players finish early by sheer randomness, even if they apply low
effort. After those, there is a whole bunch of players who apply the optimal strategy
and, when the reward is piecewise constant, finish about the same time. This is where
the first sudden increase in the c.d.f shows up.
In the remaining part of this section, we fix H(r) = 6(1 − r)2 except in Section 3.2.2
where we analyze the dependence on H .
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Figure 1: Equilibrium completion time distribution, value function and effort function with
H(r) = 6(1− r)2.
3.2.1 Dependence on the tournament horizon
Table 1 shows that as the deadline increases, both the equilibrium terminal completion
rate and the game value increase (as proved in Proposition 3.1). However, with a longer
deadline it takes longer to reach a fixed percentage of completion. On the other hand,
we also see that the quantile functions are not too sensitive to changes in the deadline,
except near the discontinuity r = Fµ(T ). This suggests that competition alone is often good
enough to drive the progress; the external deadline provides a little extra, but not significant
motivation.
3.2.2 Dependence on the reward function
Next, we focus on the two-parameter family:
H(r) = K(1 + p)(1− r)p
where K =
∫ 1
0
H(r)dr represents the total reward budget, and p determines the convexity
of the reward function. A large p means that most of the reward is given to highly ranked
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Figure 2: Equilibrium completion time distribution, value function and effort function with
H(r) = 5 · 1[0,0.25)(r) + 2 · 1[0.25,0.5)(r) + 1[0.5,1](r).
players. In many examples, including population income in US, the prize money decreases
in a very convex manner, with high “earners” earning a very large chunk of the pie.
We see from the top left panel of Figure 3 that, with a moderate value K = 2, as p
increases, the peak of fµ = F
′
µ shifts to the left, meaning most of the players finish earlier.
On the other hand, this is at the expense of a lower population completion rate, since the
laggards, knowing that the reward drops quickly once the leaders have occupied the high
ranks, put in less effort and give up more easily. The lower completion rate also leads to a
lower game value; see the bottom left panel of Figure 3. Thus, when the pie is not too small,
the higher the convexity of the reward function, the lower the welfare. That is, shifting the
rewards more to the highly ranked players decreases the welfare. However, the monotonicity
of the welfare in p is only true when there is sufficient benefit for finishing early. The top
right panel of Figure 3 shows that when the reward K is small (similar behavior can be
observed when x0 or c is large), both the population terminal completion rate and the game
value are no longer decreasing in p. A more complete picture is shown in the bottom right
panel of Figure 3. We only plot the game value, since it moves in the same direction as the
completion rate.
We focus now on the following implications of our results: since the expected total effort
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T 1st quartile median 3rd quartile Fµ(T ) V
0.5 0.281 - - 44.9% 0.074
1 0.285 0.613 - 61.9% 0.121
2 0.289 0.630 - 73.6% 0.166
5 0.293 0.649 2.424 83.4% 0.215
10 0.295 0.658 2.545 88.1% 0.237
100 0.296 0.666 2.661 96.0% 0.256
∞ 0.296 0.667 2.667 100% 0.257
Table 1: Equilibrium quartiles, completion rates and game values under varying deadline.
increases with the (terminal) completion rate when we fix x0, σ, T (see Proposition 3.2), the
expected effort will be lower as we increase p in the top left panel of Figure 3; that is,
the expected total effort decreases with the level of competition (more unequal rewards).
Thus, when the total pie is large enough, the competitiveness resulting from inequality in
rewards has a demoralizing effect, as in Fang et al. (2018). However, the top right panel
of Figure 3 shows that when the total pie K is small, the completion rate and hence the
effort level may go up with more unequal payment. This is because there is another effect
that decreases competitiveness – a higher percentage of players gives up, and if the rewards
are more uneven it is still worthwhile for the players who do not give up to exert higher
effort, bringing up the aggregate completion rate. That is, the players who do not give up
are less discouraged by the prize inequality, because they compete within a smaller group.10
If, for example, we consider the competition of building internet search engines, or social
media sites, or computer operating systems as a tournament race, assuming that our infinite
players game with a fixed pie is still a decent approximation, since the total pie is large
and the rewards are uneven, our results suggest that there is loss of efficiency in that many
players get discouraged from applying effort. They also suggest that government subsidies for
R&D (e.g., for renewable energy) that make the rewards more even among different players
are efficiency improving, but only in areas in which the profits to be made are likely to be
substantial.
3.2.3 Dependence on the cost parameter
Figure 4 illustrates the dependence on the cost parameter c. As c increases, the welfare
value first experiences an increase before it starts to decrease. The intuition is the same
as in the case of T = ∞ (in which case, as we proved in Proposition 3.1(iii), the value is
always increasing in cost): the aggregate welfare does not depend on the relative ranks of
the players, while, with low cost, the players compete for those ranks “too hard” against
each other, raising the realized cost of effort and bringing down the welfare value. Thus,
higher cost c can be beneficial, by discouraging the players to work too hard. However, as
c continues to increase, the possibility of failing to finish by the deadline starts to offset the
10Note that in Fang et al. (2018) the size of the pie is directly linked to the aggregate effort, and not fixed
exogenously as in the present example.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium completion time distribution and game value under different total
reward K and convexity index p. The numbers on the curves in the top panels represent
their corresponding game values.
benefit of a reduced effort, and the value starts to decrease.11
3.3 Reverse engineering: realizing a target distribution
Theorem 3.1 allows us to obtain, for a given reward function, the corresponding equilib-
rium distribution. The opposite problem is also important: if we want to achieve a certain
equilibrium distribution, how do we go about it? The following two theorems, for T = ∞
and T <∞ respectively, do the following:
(i) identify which distributions µ are realized in equilibrium and by which reward function;
(ii) identify conditions under which a distribution µ can be realized by an expected budget
not higher than a given budget K.
11We note that with Poisson type uncertainty (sudden breakthroughs), in the infinite horizon model of
Nutz and Zhang (2017), the game value is independent of c.
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Figure 4: Game value against the cost parameter.
These results are also helpful in allowing us to convert an optimization over reward functions
to an equivalent one over the set of feasible equilibrium distributions. The latter problem is
easier in some cases; see Section 3.4.3 for an example.
Let H0 be the set of bounded, decreasing reward functions from [0, 1] to [R∞,∞), and
E : H0 → P(R+), for T =∞,
ET : H0 → P(T0), for T <∞,
be the mappings from H to the equilibrium completion time distribution µ, where T0 =
[0, T ]∪ {∞}. Observe that E is translation invariant, i.e., E(H +C) = E(H) for any C ∈ R
such that H + C ≥ R∞. We first show that E and ET are one-to-one mappings up to a.e.
equivalence, and in the infinite horizon case, also up to an additive constant.
Lemma 3.1. Let H1, H2 ∈ H0.
(i) Suppose E(H1) = E(H2) = µ, then H1 = H2 + C a.e. for some constant C.
(ii) Suppose ET (H1) = ET (H2) = µ, then H1 = H2 a.e. on [0, Fµ(T )].
Proof. We only prove (ii); case (i) is similar. By (3.2),
Fτ◦
x0/σ
(t) =
1− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )
1− Fµ(T )
∫ Fµ(t)
0
exp
(
R∞ −Hi(z)
2cσ2
)
dz, t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, 2.
Differentiating both sides and rearranging terms yields
Hi(Fµ(t)) = 2cσ
2 ln
(
fµ(t)
fτ◦
x0/σ
(t)
)
+ 2cσ2 ln
(
1− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )
1− Fµ(T )
)
+R∞ a.e.
It follows that∫ Fµ(T )
0
|H1(r)−H2(r)|dr =
∫ T
0
|H1(Fµ(t))−H2(Fµ(t))| fµ(t)dt = 0,
and consequently, H1 = H2 a.e. on [0, Fµ(T )].
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Denote by P+(R+) (reps. P+(T0)) the set of probability distributions on R+ (resp. T0)
that have strictly positive density on R+ (resp. [0, T ]). The key quantity is the normalized
density
ζµ := fµ/fτ◦
x0/σ
,
and if T <∞, also the normalized incompletion rate
δµ :=
1− Fµ(T )
1− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )
.
Theorem 3.2. Fix K ≥ R∞. For µ ∈ P+(R+), define
Hµ(r) := 2cσ
2 ln ζµ(F
−1
µ (r)).
We have
(i) E(H0) = {µ ∈ P+(R+) : ln ζµ is bounded and decreasing} and
E−1(µ) = {Hµ + C : C ≥ R∞ − 2cσ2 ln (inf ζµ)}, 12 µ ∈ E(H0).
(ii) For µ ∈ E(H0),
∫ 1
0
(Hµ(r) + C)dr ≤ K if and only if C ≤ K − 2cσ2
∫∞
0
ln ζµ(t)dµ(t).
Proof. (i) By Proposition 2.1, E(H0) ⊆ {µ ∈ P+(R+) : ln ζµ is bounded and decreasing}.
Conversely, given any µ ∈ P+(R+) such that ln ζµ is bounded and decreasing, Hµ is also
bounded and decreasing. Since F−1µ : [0, 1] 7→ R+ is bijective, Hµ + C ≥ R∞ if and only
C ≥ R∞ − 2cσ2 ln(inf ζµ). It is straightforward to check that µ satisfies (3.6) with H = Hµ:
∫ r
0
exp
(
−Hµ(z)
2cσ2
)
dz∫ 1
0
exp
(
−Hµ(z)
2cσ2
)
dz
=
∫ r
0
fτ◦
x0/σ
(F−1µ (z))
fµ(F
−1
µ (z))
dz∫ 1
0
fτ◦
x0/σ
(F−1µ (z))
fµ(F
−1
µ (z))
dz
=
∫ F−1µ (r)
0
fτ◦
x0/σ
(t)
fµ(t)
dFµ(t)∫∞
0
fτ◦
x0/σ
(t)
fµ(t)
dFµ(t)
= Fτ◦
x0/σ
(
F−1µ (r)
)
.
Hence, E(Hµ + C) = E(Hµ) = µ by the translation invariance of E . By Lemma 3.1(i),
any admissible reward scheme realizing µ differs from Hµ by a constant. (ii) follows from
straightforward calculation.
Theorem 3.3. Fix T <∞ and K ≥ R∞ . For µ ∈ P+(T0), define
H˜µ(r) := R∞ + 2cσ
21[0,Fµ(T )](r)
{
ln ζµ(F
−1
µ (r))− ln δµ
}
.
We have
(i) ET (H0) =
{
µ ∈ P+(T0) : ln ζµ is bounded and decreasing, inf
t∈[0,T ]
ζµ(t) ≥ δµ
}
, and
E−1T (µ) = {H ∈ H0 : H|[0,Fµ(T )] = H˜µ|[0,Fµ(T )]}, µ ∈ ET (H0).
12Here and in the sequel, we identify a reward function H with its equivalence class under a.e. relation.
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(ii) For µ ∈ ET (H0),
∫ 1
0
H˜µ(r)dr =
∫ Fµ(T )
0
H˜µ(r)dr + (1− Fµ(T ))R∞ ≤ K if and only if∫ T
0
ln ζµ(t)dµ(t) ≤ K − R∞
2cσ2
+ Fµ(T ) ln δµ.
Proof. (i) Let µ ∈ ET (H0). By Proposition 2.1, we have that µ ∈ P+(T0) and ln ζµ is
bounded and decreasing. Moreover, since H ≥ R∞, we have that for t ∈ [0, T ],
ζµ(t) =
fµ(t)
fτ◦
x0/σ
(t)
=
u(t, 0;µ, c)
u(0, x0;µ, c)
=
1− Fµ(T )
1− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )
exp
(
H(Fµ(t))− R∞
2cσ2
)
≥ δµ.
Conversely, given any µ ∈ P+(T) such that ln ζµ is bounded and decreasing, and inft∈[0,T ] ζµ(t) ≥
δµ, we have H˜µ ∈ H0. It is straightforward to check that µ satisfies (3.2) with H = H˜µ: for
r ∈ [0, Fµ(T )],
1− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )
1− Fµ(T )
∫ r
0
exp
(
R∞ − H˜µ(z)
2cσ2
)
dz =
∫ r
0
fτ◦
x0/σ
(F−1µ (z))
fµ(F−1µ (z))
dz
=
∫ F−1µ (r)
0
fτ◦
x0/σ
(t)
fµ(t)
dFµ(t) = Fτ◦
x0/σ
(F−1µ (r)).
Hence, ET (H˜µ) = µ. By Lemma 3.1(ii), any admissible reward scheme realizing µ must
agree with H˜µ on [0, Fµ(T )]. Conversely, since the reward after rank Fµ(T ) is irrelevant in
determining the individual’s best response, we have ET (H) = ET (H˜µ) = µ for any H ∈ H0
which agrees with H˜µ on [0, Fµ(T )]. (ii) follows from straightforward calculation.
3.4 Optimal reward design
The semi-explicit characterization of the equilibrium allows us to further study the op-
timal reward design problem for a principal or social planner. We continue to consider only
the reward functions of the form (3.1) with H ∈ H0, in which case there exists a unique
equilibrium with completion time distribution denoted by E(H) or ET (H).
We consider three different optimization criteria: minimizing time to achieve a given
population completion rate (Section 3.4.1), maximizing welfare (Section 3.4.2) and max-
imizing net profit (Section 3.4.3). To preview the results: for the first two criteria, the
optimal reward is a two-step function – the same reward for all sufficiently high ranks, and
the same minimum guaranteed payment R∞ for the low ranks. This is different from the
one-stage Poisson game of Nutz and Zhang (2017) where the quantile-minimizing reward
scheme is concave for high ranks. For the third problem where for a given profit function
g, we maximize the expected profit Eg(τ) minus the cost of reward, with τ drawn from the
infinite horizon equilibrium distribution, the optimal reward for finishing at time t is a linear
transformation of g(t) for t lower than a bonus deadline t∗b , and R∞ otherwise.
Here we only highlight the proof of the third problem where we rely on the result from
reverse engineering. All other proofs are provided in the appendix.
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3.4.1 Minimizing the time to achieve a given completion rate
We fix a deadline T ∈ (0,∞], a total reward budget K, a target completion rate α ∈ (0, 1)
and a minimum participation reward R∞ ≤ K, and look for reward function H(r) ≥ R∞
that minimizes the time it takes α fraction of the population to complete their projects in
equilibrium. More precisely, the feasible set of reward functions is
H :=
{
H ∈ H0 :
∫ 1
0
H(r)dr ≤ K
}
, for T =∞,
and, with β(H) := FET (H)(T ),
HαT :=
{
H ∈ H0 : β(H) ≥ α,
∫ β(H)
0
H(r)dr + (1− β(H))R∞ ≤ K
}
, for T <∞.
For H ∈ H, let Tα(H) := T E(H)α be the α-quantile of E(H). We wish to find T ∗α =
infH∈H Tα(H), and identify the minimizer H
∗, if it exists. Similarly, for H ∈ HT , let
Tα(H ;T ) := T
ET (H)
α be the α-quantile of ET (H). We will look for the optimizer of T ∗α(T ) =
infH∈HαT Tα(H ;T ).
Remark 3.3. For the finite horizon problem, there are two different ways to impose the
budget constraint: (i) to require
∫ 1
0
H(r)dr ≤ K, as in the definition of H; in this case, the
budget may not be fully utilized due to a portion of the players failing to complete by time
T , but the advantage of such a constraint is that the total reward does not go over K even
out of equilibrium; (ii) to bound the total reward only in equilibrium:
∫ β(H)
0
H(r)dr + (1 −
β(H))R∞, as in the definition of HαT ; such a constraint is weaker, but it might be violated if
the population does not end up in equilibrium. It turns out, as we will see in Theorem 3.5,
that the two constraints result in the same optimal value and optimal reward function.
The following two theorems present the optimal reward functions and the corresponding
equilibria.
Theorem 3.4. Let T =∞. Then, infH∈H Tα(H) is uniquely attained (up to a.e. equivalence)
by the uniform scheme with cutoff rank α:
H∗(r) = R∞ +
K − R∞
α
1[0,α](r).
The minimal time is
T ∗α = Tα(H
∗) = F−1τ◦
x0/σ
(
α
α + (1− α) exp (K−R∞
2αcσ2
)) .
The c.d.f. of µ = E(H∗) is given by
Fµ(t) =

(
α + (1− α) exp (K−R∞
2αcσ2
))
Fτ◦
x0/σ
(t), if t ≤ T ∗α,
Fτ◦
x0/σ
(t) + α
(
1− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(t)
) (
1− exp (R∞−K
2αcσ2
))
, if t > T ∗α .
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The equilibrium value attained by each player is
V = R∞ − 2cσ2 ln
(
α exp
(
R∞ −K
2αcσ2
)
+ 1− α
)
,
and the equilibrium effort, in feedback form, is
a(t, x) =
2
[
exp
(
K−R∞
2αcσ2
)− 1]N ′( x
σ
√
T ∗α−t
)
σ√
T ∗α−t
1 + 2
[
exp
(
K−R∞
2αcσ2
)− 1] [1−N ( x
σ
√
T ∗α−t
)] ,
where N and N ′ are the c.d.f. and p.d.f. of the standard normal distribution.
Theorem 3.5. Let the deadline T < ∞, the minimum participation reward R∞, the total
reward budget K ≥ R∞ and the target completion rate α ∈ (0, 1) be given. We have T ∗α(T ) =
infH∈HαT Tα(H ;T ) = infH∈H Tα(H ;T ). Let T
∗
α be the optimal time given by Theorem 3.4.
• If T < T ∗α, then HαT = ∅ and T ∗α(T ) = ∆.
• If T ≥ T ∗α, then T ∗α(T ) = T ∗α is uniquely attained (up to a.e. equivalence) by the uniform
scheme with cutoff rank α:
H∗(r) = R∞ +
K − R∞
α
1[0,α](r).
The c.d.f. of µ = ET (H∗) on [0, T ], the equilibrium value V attained by each player and
the equilibrium effort a(t, x), t ∈ [0, T ] in feedback form have the same expression as
those of Theorem 3.4.
• The minimum budget needed to ensure that α fraction of players finish by time T is
Kmin = R∞ + 2αcσ
2 ln
(
α
1− α ·
1− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )
Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )
)
.
The reward scheme which achieves the goal with budget Kmin is given by
H(r) = R∞ +
Kmin −R∞
α
1[0,α](r).
• Under the given budget K, the maximum equilibrium completion rate αmax attainable
at time T is the unique solution of
CT :=
Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )
1− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )
=
αmax
1− αmax exp
(
R∞ −K
2αmaxcσ2
)
.13
The reward scheme which yields αmax is given by
H(r) = R∞ +
K − R∞
αmax
1[0,αmax](r).
13αmax can also be expressed as
(
1 + 2cσ
2
K−R∞W
(
C−1T
))−1
, where W is the Lambert-W function.
25
3.4.2 Maximizing welfare
We now find the reward scheme that maximizes the aggregate game value of all the
players, again in the homogeneous case.
Theorem 3.6. Fix the participation reward R∞ and the reward budget K ≥ R∞. Then,
(i) When T = ∞, the maximum welfare supH∈H V∞(H) = K is uniquely attained (up to
a.e. equivalence) by the uniform schemeH∗(r) ≡ K (thus, with zero effort by everyone).
(ii) When T <∞, the maximum welfare
sup
H∈H0T
V (H) = R∞ + 2cσ
2 ln
(
1− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )
1− α
)
is uniquely attained (up to a.e. equivalence) by the uniform scheme with cutoff rank α:
H∗(r) = R∞ +
K − R∞
α
1[0,α](r),
where α is the maximum attainable completion rate by time T , given in Theorem 3.5.
Moreover, H∗ also maximizes the expected total effort given by Proposition 3.2.
3.4.3 Maximizing net profit
We now suppose that each project completed at time t generates a profit of g(t) = g(t; x0)
for a principal. We assume that g is continuous, bounded and decreasing, and that g 6≡ g(∞).
The principal wants to maximize the expected net profit E [g(τ)− Rµ(τ)], τ ∼ µ, subject to
the participation constraint R ≥ R∞. We only consider the case T =∞.
Theorem 3.7. Suppose T =∞. A reward scheme H∗ ∈ H0 is optimal if and only if
H∗(r) = R∞ + g(F
−1
µ∗ (r) ∧ t∗b)− g(t∗b),
where the “bonus” deadline t∗b is given by t
∗
b = inf{z ≥ 0 : g(z) = g(z∗)} for some
z∗ = argmax
z∈[0,∞)
∫∞
0
g(t ∨ z)fτ◦
x0/σ
(t) exp
(
g(t∧z)
2cσ2
)
dt∫∞
0
fτ◦
x0/σ
(s) exp
(
g(s∧z)
2cσ2
)
ds
,
and where the associated equilibrium distribution µ∗ has p.d.f.
fµ∗(t) =
fτ◦
x0/σ
(t) exp
(
g(t∧t∗b )
2cσ2
)
∫∞
0
fτ◦
x0/σ
(s) exp
(
g(s∧t∗b )
2cσ2
)
ds
.
The maximum net profit is
U =
∫∞
0
g(t ∨ t∗b)fτ◦x0/σ(t) exp
(
g(t∧t∗b )
2cσ2
)
dt∫∞
0
fτ◦
x0/σ
(s) exp
(
g(s∧t∗b )
2cσ2
)
ds
− R∞.
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Note that in equilibrium the players receiveH∗(Fµ∗(t)) = R∞+g(t∧t∗b)−g(t∗b) for finishing
at time t. That is, the optimal reward for finishing at time t is a linear transformation of g(t)
for those who finish before the bonus deadline t∗b ; otherwise it is the minimum guaranteed
payment. Thus, it is optimal for the principal to align the players’ interest with her own.
Proof of Theorem 3.7. By Theorem 3.2, we only need to optimize over µ ∈ E(H0), which
can be realized by the reward Hµ + C for any constant C ≥ R∞ − 2cσ2 ln(inf fµ/fτ◦
x0/σ
). It
is clear that among the translations of Hµ, the principal should choose the smallest C which
meets the reservation reward constraint, namely, Cµ := R∞ − 2cσ2 ln(inf fµ/fτ◦
x0/σ
). Hence
we can rewrite the optimization problem as
U = sup
fµ
∫ ∞
0
[
g(t)− 2cσ2 ln
(
fµ(t)
fτ◦
x0/σ
(t)
)
− R∞ + 2cσ2 ln
(
inf
fµ
fτ◦
x0/σ
)]
fµ(t)dt.
The proof consists of two steps.
Step 1 Fix b = inf fµ/fτ◦
x0/σ
∈ (0, 1] and solve the constraint optimization problem:
U(b) : = sup
fµ≥bfτ◦
x0/σ
∫ ∞
0
[
g(t)− 2cσ2 ln
(
fµ(t)
bfτ◦
x0/σ
(t)
)]
fµ(t)dt−R∞
subject to the additional integral constraint∫ ∞
0
fµ(t)dt = 1.
In addition, we also need to fµ/fτ◦
x0/σ
to be bounded and decreasing in order to obtain
a bounded, decreasing reward function Hµ. This can be verified after we find the
optimizer.
Step 2 Maximize U(b) over b ∈ (0, 1].
We introduce a Lagrange multiplier λ to handle the integral constraint. Define
L(fµ, λ) : =
∫ ∞
0
[
g(t)− 2cσ2 ln
(
fµ(t)
bfτ◦
x0/σ
(t)
)]
fµ(t)dt− λ
(∫ ∞
0
fµ(t)dt− 1
)
.
For each fixed λ, the integrand, being a concave function of fµ, attains a pointwise maximum
at
fµ(b)(t) = bfτ◦
x0/σ
(t) exp
([
g(t)− λ
2cσ2
− 1
]+)
(3.10)
on [bfτ◦
x0/σ
(t),∞). We then find λ via
1 =
∫ ∞
0
fµ(b)(s)ds =
∫ ∞
0
bfτ◦
x0/σ
(s) exp
([
g(s)− λ
2cσ2
− 1
]+)
ds =: φ(λ). (3.11)
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Note that the above equation has a unique solution in (−∞, g(0)−2cσ2] since φ is continuous,
strictly decreasing and satisfies φ(g(0)− 2cσ2) = b ≤ 1 and limλ→−∞ φ(λ) = ∞. Since any
λ ≥ g(0)− 2cσ2 (which is only possible when b = 1) leads to the same fµ(b), we may assume
without loss of generality that λ ≤ g(0)−2cσ2. It is clear that for each b ∈ (0, 1], fµ(b)/fτ◦
x0/σ
is bounded and decreasing. So the associated reward scheme Hµ(b) + Cµ(b) ∈ H0.
Define
b0 :=
(∫ ∞
0
fτ◦
x0/σ
(t) exp
(
g(t)− g(∞)
2cσ2
)
dt
)−1
∈ (0, 1).
It is not hard to see from (3.11) that b ≥ b0 if and only if g(∞) ≤ 2cσ2 + λ. We consider
two cases for b.
Case 1. If 0 < b < b0, or equivalently, g(∞) > 2cσ2 + λ, the positive part in (3.10) and (3.11)
can be removed, leading to
fµ(b)(t) =
fτ◦
x0/σ
(t) exp
(
g(t)−λ
2cσ2
− 1
)
∫∞
0
fτ◦
x0/σ
(s) exp
(
g(s)−λ
2cσ2
− 1
)
ds
= b0fτ◦
x0/σ
(t) exp
(
g(t)− g(∞)
2cσ2
)
.
In this case,
U(b) =
∫ ∞
0
[
g(t)− 2cσ2 ln
(
fµ(b)(t)
bfτ◦
x0/σ
(t)
)]
fµ(b)(t)dt− R∞
=
∫ ∞
0
[
g(∞) + 2cσ2 ln b
b0
]
b0fτ◦
x0/σ
(t) exp
(
g(t)− g(∞)
2cσ2
)
dt− R∞
<
∫ ∞
0
g(∞)b0fτ◦
x0/σ
(t) exp
(
g(t)− g(∞)
2cσ2
)
dt−R∞
=
∫∞
0
g(∞)fτ◦
x0/σ
(t) exp
(
g(t)
2cσ2
)
dt∫∞
0
fτ◦
x0/σ
(s) exp
(
g(s)
2cσ2
)
ds
− R∞ =: U0.
Case 2. If b0 ≤ b ≤ 1, or equivalently, g(∞) ≤ 2cσ2 + λ, let
tb := inf{t ≥ 0 : g(t) ≤ 2cσ2 + λ} ∈ [0,∞]
be the point after which the constraint fµ ≥ bfτ◦
x0/σ
will be binding. By the continuity
of g and that g(0)− λ ≥ 2cσ2, we must have g(tb) = 2cσ2 + λ. It follows that[
g(s)− λ
2cσ2
− 1
]+
=
[
g(s)− g(tb)
2cσ2
]+
=
g(s ∧ tb)− g(tb)
2cσ2
.
Thus, we are again able to get rid of the positive part in (3.10) and (3.11), and get
fµ(b)(t) = bfτ◦
x0/σ
(t) exp
(
g(t ∧ tb)− g(tb)
2cσ2
)
, (3.12)
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and
b =
(∫ ∞
0
fτ◦
x0/σ
(s) exp
(
g(s ∧ tb)− g(tb)
2cσ2
)
ds
)−1
=: ψ(tb). (3.13)
It can be shown that the [b0, 1]-valued function ψ is decreasing on [0,∞] and strictly
decreasing on any interval where g is strictly decreasing. This implies ψ(z1) = ψ(z2)
if and only if g(z1) = g(z2). So if ψ(z) = b = ψ(tb), then g(z) = g(tb), and since
tb is the first time g hits 2cσ
2 + λ, we must have z ≥ tb. In other words, tb can be
characterized as the smallest solution of ψ(z) = b. Alternatively, if b = ψ(z0), then
tb = inf{z ≥ 0 : g(z) = g(z0)}, independent of the choice of z0.
Using (3.12), we obtain
U(b) =
∫ ∞
0
[
g(t)− 2cσ2 ln
(
fµ(b)(t)
bfτ◦
x0/σ
(t)
)]
fµ(b)(t)dt− R∞
=
∫ ∞
0
[g(t)− g(t ∧ tb) + g(tb)] bfτ◦
x0/σ
(t) exp
(
g(t ∧ tb)− g(tb)
2cσ2
)
dt− R∞
=
∫∞
0
g(t ∨ tb)fτ◦
x0/σ
(t) exp
(
g(t∧tb)
2cσ2
)
dt∫∞
0
fτ◦
x0/σ
(s) exp
(
g(s∧tb)
2cσ2
)
ds
− R∞, b ∈ [b0, 1].
Observe that setting tb =∞ in the above expression yields U0.
Combining the two cases, we see that U(b) < U˜(∞) if b ∈ (0, b0) and U(b) = U˜(tb) if
b ∈ [b0, 1], where we introduce the auxiliary objective function
U˜(z) :=
∫∞
0
g(t ∨ z)fτ◦
x0/σ
(t) exp
(
g(t∧z)
2cσ2
)
dt∫∞
0
fτ◦
x0/σ
(s) exp
(
g(s∧z)
2cσ2
)
ds
− R∞.
Clearly, supb∈(0,1] U(b) ≤ supz∈[0,∞] U˜(z). Since U˜(z) is continuous and U˜(0) > g(∞)−R∞ =
U˜(∞), supz∈[0,∞] U˜(z) is attained by some z∗ <∞ which can be found numerically.
CLAIM: Maximizing U(b) is equivalent to maximizing U˜(z) in the following sense:
(i) supb∈(0,1] U(b) = supz∈[0,∞] U˜(z);
(ii) b∗ ∈ argmaxb∈(0,1] U(b) if and only if b∗ = ψ(z∗) for some z∗ ∈ argmaxz∈[0,∞] U˜(z).
The proof of the claim relies on the observation that if b = ψ(z), then U(b) = U˜(tb) ≥
U˜(z). Indeed, b = ψ(z) implies that z ≥ tb and g(z) = g(tb) as we have argued before, which
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further yields g(t ∧ z) = g(t ∧ tb). Consequently,
U(b) = U˜(tb) =
∫∞
0
g(t ∨ tb)fτ◦
x0/σ
(t) exp
(
g(t∧tb)
2cσ2
)
dt∫∞
0
fτ◦
x0/σ
(s) exp
(
g(s∧tb)
2cσ2
)
ds
−R∞
=
∫∞
0
g(t ∨ tb)fτ◦
x0/σ
(t) exp
(
g(t∧z)
2cσ2
)
dt∫∞
0
fτ◦
x0/σ
(s) exp
(
g(s∧z)
2cσ2
)
ds
−R∞
≥
∫∞
0
g(t ∨ z)fτ◦
x0/σ
(t) exp
(
g(t∧z)
2cσ2
)
dt∫∞
0
fτ◦
x0/σ
(s) exp
(
g(s∧z)
2cσ2
)
ds
− R∞ = U˜(z).
The above observation implies that if z∗ is optimal for U˜ , then we have supb∈(0,1] U(b) ≥
U(ψ(z∗)) ≥ U˜(z∗) = supz∈[0,∞] U˜(z) ≥ supb∈(0,1] U(b). This proves the first claim and the “if”
part of the second claim. For the “only if” part of the second claim, suppose b∗ is optimal
for U , then U(b∗) = supb∈(0,1] U(b) = supz∈[0,∞] U˜(z) ≥ U˜(∞). Since U(b) < U˜(∞) for all
b ∈ (0, b0), we must have b∗ ∈ [b0, 1]. It follows that b∗ = ψ(tb∗) and U˜(tb∗) = U(b∗) =
supb∈(0,1] U(b) = supz∈[0,∞] U˜(z). The latter implies tb∗ is optimal for U˜ .
In view of the claim, we can find the optimal value and all optimizers of supb∈(0,1] U(b)
by solving the auxiliary problem. For each optimal z∗ for the auxiliary problem, we get an
optimal b∗ = ψ(z∗). We then recover fµ∗ = fµ(b∗) by (3.12) and Hµ∗ by Theorem 3.2. The
optimal reward is given by
H∗(r) = Hµ∗(r) +R∞ − 2cσ2 ln b∗ = R∞ + g(F−1µ∗ (r) ∧ tb∗)− g(tb∗).
3.5 Extension: completion rate-dependent pie and multiple equi-
libria
Consider a reward pie that depends on the aggregate completion rate by time T < ∞.
(That rate is 100% when T =∞.) Specifically, we assume the reward for finishing at time t
rank r, and when the population completion rate is β, is given by
R(t, r, β) = 1{t≤T}H(r, β) + 1{t>T}R∞(β), (3.14)
where H : [0, 1]× [Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T ), 1] 7→ R and R∞ : [Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T ), 1] 7→ R are continuous in β. What
we have in mind is an organization or a society in which the overall wealth coming from
individual projects is higher when more individuals complete their goals. Similar to the case
of a fixed pie, the equilibrium also admits a semi-explicit characterization:
Theorem 3.8. Let T < ∞. Suppose the reward function is of the form (3.14). Then,
there exist at least one equilibrium, and a distribution µ is an equilibrium completion time
30
distribution if and only if
T µr = F
−1
τ◦
x0/σ
(
1− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )
1− Fµ(T )
∫ r
0
exp
(
R∞(Fµ(T ))−H(z, Fµ(T ))
2cσ2
)
dz
)
, r ∈ [0, Fµ(T )],
(3.15)
where
Fτ◦
x0/σ
(t) = 2
(
1−N
(
x0
σ
√
t
))
.
Moreover, the equilibrium terminal completion rate Fµ(T ) ∈ (0, 1) is a solution of
Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )
1− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )
=
1
1− Fµ(T )
∫ Fµ(T )
0
exp
(
R∞(Fµ(T ))−H(z, Fµ(T ))
2cσ2
)
dz. (3.16)
The associated value and expected total effort of the game are given by
V (µ) = R∞(Fµ(T )) + 2cσ
2 ln
(
1− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )
1− Fµ(T )
)
(3.17)
and (3.9), respectively.
Proof. The proof is similar to the case of a fixed pie. So we shall be brief. The fixed point
equation (in terms of the p.d.f. of the completion time distribution) for a freshly started
game is
fµ(t) =
u(t, 0;µ, c)
u(0, x0;µ, c)
fτ◦
x0/σ
(t), t ∈ [0, T ].
Let y(r) := Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T µr ). As before, it can be shown that exp
(
H(r,Fµ(T ))
2cσ2
)
y′(r) is independent
of r on [0, Fµ(T )], from which we obtain (3.15). Setting r = Fµ(T ) in (3.15) leads to an
equation for Fµ(T ), namely (3.16). The existence of a solution follows from the fact that
φ(β) :=
1
1− β
∫ β
0
exp
(
R∞(β)−H(z, β)
2cσ2
)
dz (3.18)
is a continuous function on [0, 1) satisfying φ(0) = 0 and limβ→1 φ(β) = ∞. Each solution
of (3.16) yields an equilibrium completion time distribution µ. The associated game value
V (µ) = v(0, x0;µ, c) = 2cσ
2 ln u(0, x0;µ, c) follows from straightforward computation as
before. The derivation of the expected total effort is the same as that in Proposition 3.2.
Note that we do not necessarily have uniqueness under conditions of Theorem 3.8. Equa-
tion (3.16) may have multiple solutions, leading to multiple equilibria. For example, when
H(r, β) = R∞(β) + β, one can check that equation (3.16) may have one, two or three solu-
tions, depending on the value of T, x0, c, σ (see Figure 5). Among the equilibria, the dominant
one (i.e., the one with the highest game value) corresponds to the largest solution of (3.16).
In this example, we see that by limiting the size of the projects or imposing a long enough
deadline, the “bad” equilibria can be avoided.
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Figure 5: The blue curve plots the right hand side of (3.16) as a function of Fµ(T ) with c = 1,
σ = 0.25 and H(r, β) = R∞(β)+β. The two horizontal lines plot the left hand side of (3.16)
in the two critical cases. We see that there is a unique equilibrium when Fτ◦
x0/σ
< 0.0063 or
Fτ◦
x0/σ
> 0.0505, two equilibria when Fτ◦
x0/σ
= 0.0063 or 0.0505, and three equilibria when
0.0063 < Fτ◦
x0/σ
< 0.0505.
When reward R(t, r, β) is independent of rank r and increasing in completion rate β, we
have a contribution game where the interaction is not through the aggregate effort towards a
single project as in, for example, Georgiadis (2015), but through the completion rate of many
parallel projects. By gradually injecting rank dependence into the game, one can analyze
the effect of competition on the completion rate and the game value.
Consider, for example,
R(t, r, β) = Π(β)
[
γ + 1{t≤T}(1− γ)Hε(r)
]
where Π(β) := K(1+β) represents the size of the pie, γ ∈ [0, 1] is the fraction of the pie that
are used to reward participation, and Hǫ(r) = 1+ǫ(1−2r) specifies how the remaining (1−γ)
fraction of the pie is shared among players who finish by the deadline and are ranked. A
larger ǫ corresponds to a larger degree of competition (or inequality) among ranked players.
When ǫ = 0, we have a pure contribution game. Figure 6 plots the equilibrium completion
rate and game value against ǫ for γ = 0.5. We see that the degree of inequality in the rewards
has a positive effect on the equilibrium completion rate and the game value when the pie
(that is, K) is small, an adverse effect when the pie is large, and a mixed effect when the
size of the pie is moderate. The intuition is the same as in the case of the fixed pie: when
the pie is large, the demoralizing effect of competitiveness prevails. However, when the pie is
small, a higher percentage of players gives up, and higher prize inequality makes the players
who do not give up exert higher effort, as they, competing within a smaller group, are less
discouraged by the prize inequality.
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Figure 6: Fµ(T ) and V against ǫ. Parameters are set to x0 = c = T = 1, σ = 0.25
and γ = 0.5. When K = 1.5, there is an interval of ǫ where the mapping ǫ 7→ Fµ(T ) is
multi-valued; meaning the game has multiple equilibria.
4 General case: existence, uniqueness, stability and ǫ-
Nash equilibrium
In this section, we work with general reward functions R ∈ R, and no longer assume
players are homogeneous. We introduce heterogeneity by assuming that a tournament is
characterized by the initial condition (t0, π,m), where t0 < T is the starting time, π is the
proportion of players that have already finished by time t0, and m ∈ P(R++ × [c, c]) ⊆ R2++
is the joint distribution of the time-t0 location, denoted by ξ, and the cost of effort c of the
population still playing.14 We assume that we are in the non-degenerate case π < 1.
4.1 Existence of a fixed point
Given an initial condition (t0, π,m), for a representative player we introduce a binary
random variable θ ∈ {0, 1} with P (θ = 1) = π and P (θ = 0) = 1 − π. We interpret θ as
the player’s game completion status at time t0; θ = 1 means game is completed and θ = 0
means game is in progress. If θ = 0, we further pick a time-t0 location ξ and cost of effort
coefficient c randomly from the joint distribution m. The initial randomizations (θ, ξ, c) are
assumed to be independent of the Brownian motions driving the state process.
For a given starting time t0, fix a [t0,∞)-supported completion time distribution µ of the
population with µ({t0}) = π, i.e., µ is a modification of the completion time distribution by
moving all the mass before time t0 to time t0. Since the probability for finishing exactly at
time t0 is zero, such a modification does not affect the player’s optimization problem.
The existence proof will be based on a fixed-point argument. For that purpose, we now
14Inhomogeneity in σ ∈ [σ, σ] could be easily incorporated as well, by taking m to be the joint distribution
of (ξ, c, σ).
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define the best response mapping Φt0,π,m which maps µ to the distribution L(τµ) of the
optimal completion time τµ. Assume for the moment that T <∞. If θ = 1, we set τµ := t0.
If θ = 0, we solve the player’s optimization problem with initial randomization (ξ, c) and
using payoff function Rµ(t) = R(t, Fµ(t)). We set τµ := inf{t ∈ [t0, T ] : Xµt = 0} ∧ ∆,15
where ∆ is a fixed number in (T,∞) corresponding to incompletion, and
dXµt = −a∗(t, Xµt ;µ, c)dt+ σdBt, Xµt0 = ξ.
By Proposition 2.1, we know that for t ∈ (t0, T ], the density of the optimal completion
time is given by
P(τµ ∈ dt|θ = 1, ξ, c) = u(t, 0;µ, c)
u(t0, ξ;µ, c)
fτ◦
ξ/σ
(t− t0).
It follows that
P(τµ = t0) = π, P(τµ = ∆) = 1− P(τµ ≤ T ), (4.1)
P(τµ ≤ t) = π + (1− π)E
[∫ t
t0
u(s, 0;µ, c)
u(t0, ξ;µ, c)
fτ◦
ξ/σ
(s− t0)ds
]
, t ∈ [t0, T ]. (4.2)
In terms of the p.d.f., we have
P(τµ ∈ dt) = (1− π)E
[
u(t, 0;µ, c)
u(t0, ξ;µ, c)
fτ◦
ξ/σ
(t− t0)
]
, t ∈ (t0, T ]. (4.3)
Let T := [t0, T ] ∪ {∆}. Our goal is to find a fixed point of Φt0,π,m : µ 7→ L(τµ) in the space
P(T) of probability measures on T, which is compact in the topology of weak convergence.
Since T is compact, weak convergence on P(T) can be metrized by the 1-Wasserstein metric
(see (Villani, 2009, Corollary 6.13)):
W1(µ, µ
′) := inf
{∫
T2
|x− y|dπ(x, y) : π ∈ P(T2) with marginals µ and µ′
}
.
When T =∞, we can define Φt0,π,m in a similar fashion with ∆ :=∞. In this case, additional
care is need to ensure the compactness of P([t0,∞]); see the proof of Theorem 4.1 for details.
The main ingredient of fixed point theorems is the continuity of the best response mapping
which, in view of (4.2), amounts to the continuity of u(t, x;µ, c) with respect to µ. We can
guarantee this by restricting ourselves to reward functions R ∈ R that are continuous in
the rank variable, or more generally, of the form R(t, r) = G(t, H(r)) for some functions
G : R+×R 7→ R and H : [0, 1] 7→ R such that y 7→ G(t, y) is continuous for each t, and H is
monotone. In this way, the (potential) discontinuity in rank is decoupled from time variable.
To fix notation, let
RD := {R ∈ R : R(t, r) = G(t, H(r)), y 7→ G(t, y) is continuous for each t, H is monotone},
where D stands for “decoupled” or “decomposable”.
15We use the convention that inf ∅ =∞.
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There is another case that is sufficient for existence of a fixed point. Consider piecewise
constant H of the form
H(r) =
d∑
k=1
Rk1[rk−1,rk)(r) +Rd+11[rd,1], 0 = r0 < r1 < · · · < rd < 1, (4.4)
and define
RS := {R ∈ R : R(t, r) = G(t, H(r)), H is of the form (4.4)},
where S stands for “step function”. The nice thing about R ∈ RS is that Rµ depends
on µ only through its quantiles (T µ1 , ..., T
µ
d ); the shape of µ between each neighboring T
µ
k ’s
becomes irrelevant. In other words, each µ can be encoded to d numbers. As a consequence,
we have a fixed point problem in a d-dimensional space instead of the infinite dimensional
space of measures.
We now state our general existence theorem.
Theorem 4.1. Assume R ∈ RD ∪RS. Then Φt0,π,m has a fixed point. Thus, an equilibrium
exists.
Proof. Assume first T <∞. We will look for fixed points in the compact (Hausdorff) metric
space (P(T),W1).
Assume R ∈ RD. In order for Fµ not to hit the (potential) discontinuity of H on a
non-negligible subset of [t0, T ], we need to make sure that it is not flat there. Observe from
(4.3) that any fixed point µ of Φt0,π,m, if it exists, must have a strictly increasing c.d.f. on
[t0, T ]. This motivates us to define the following non-empty, convex subset of P(T):
Df :=
{
µ ∈ P(T) : µ([a, b]) ≥
∫ b
a
f(t)dt ∀a, b ∈ [t0, T ]
}
, (4.5)
where
f(t) := (1− π) exp
(
R∞ − R(0, 0)
2cσ2
)
Efτ◦
ξ/σ
(t− t0) > 0. (4.6)
We claim then, that
(i) Φt0,π,m(P(T)) ⊆ Df .
(ii) Df is closed under weak convergence.
(iii) Any µ ∈ Df has strictly increasing c.d.f. on [t0, T ].
(i) follows from (4.3) and (2.8). (ii) holds because µn converges to µ weakly if and only
if lim supn µn(C) ≤ µ(C) for any closed sets C ⊆ T. (iii) is obvious.
Note that weak convergence is equivalent toW1 convergence on P(T), so that (ii) implies
that Df is a closed subset of a compact space, hence also compact. To apply Schauder’s
fixed point theorem, it remains to show that Φt0,π,m is continuous on Df .
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Let {µk} ⊆ Df be such that W1(µk, µ)→ 0. We wish to show
W1(Φ
t0,π,m(µk),Φ
t,π0,m(µ)) =W1(L(τµk),L(τµ))→ 0,
or, equivalently, L(τµk) converges to L(τµ) weakly. It suffices to show Fτµk converges to Fτµ
pointwise on [t0, T ]. Recall (4.2):
Fτµk (t) = π + (1− π)E
[∫ t
t0
u(s, 0;µk, c)
u(t0, ξ;µk, c)
fτ◦
σ/ξ
(s− t0)ds
]
, t ∈ [t0, T ].
Since u is bounded by a constant independent of µk, to show the expected values converge,
we only need to show that for every x ≥ 0 and realization of c, u(t, x;µk, c) converges to
u(t, x;µ, c) for a.e. t ∈ (t0, T ]. Also, recall that
u(t, x;µk, c) = E
[
exp
(
Rµk(t+
x2
σ2
τ ◦1 )
2cσ2
)]
,
where Rµk(t) = R(t, Fµk(t)). Since W1(µk, µ) → 0, µk also converges to µ weakly, which
further implies Fµk(t) converges to Fµ(t) at every point of continuity of Fµ. Since Fµ(t) and
H(r) are monotone, they have at most countably many points of discontinuity, denoted by
t1, t2, . . . and r1, r2, . . . , respectively. Now, since µ ∈ Df , Fµ is strictly increasing on [t0, T ]
by item (iii) above. It follows that each ri can only be attained by Fµ(t) for at most one
t ∈ [t0, T ], denoted by t˜i. For any t not belonging to the countable set {ti, t˜i}i=1,2,..., we have
that Fµk(t) converges to Fµ(t), that H(Fµk(t)) converges to H(Fµ(t)) and that Rµk(t) =
G(t, H(Fµk(t))) converges to Rµ(t) = G(t, H(Fµ(t))). Bounded convergence theorem then
implies that u(t, x;µk, c) converges to u(t, x;µ, c) pointwise.
(b) Assume R ∈ RS . Let T µk = T µrk be the (rk)-quantile of µ for k = 1, . . . , d, and set
T µ0 = 0, T
µ
d+1 = ∆. Exploiting the piecewise constant structure of H , we have
Rµ(t) =
d+1∑
k=1
G(t, Rk)1[Tµk−1,T
µ
k )
(t), t ∈ [t0, T ]. (4.7)
Since Rµ depends on µ only through its quantiles (T
µ
1 , ..., T
µ
d ), as pointed out earlier, the
fixed point problem can be reduced to a finite dimensional one in the space
Q := {(T1, . . . , Td) ∈ T˜d : T1 ≤ T2 ≤ · · · ≤ Td},
where T˜ := [t0,∆] is the convex hull of T.
We will use the notation Rq(t), u(t, x;q, c) and τq instead of Rµ(t), u(t, x;µ, c) and τµ,
where q = (T1, . . . , Td) is a vector of quantiles. The best response mapping is reformulated
as
Θ : q 7→ (TL(τq)1 , . . . , TL(τq)d ).
Any fixed point q of Θ induces a fixed point L(τq) of Φt0,π,m. Note that Q is a convex,
compact set which is mapped into itself under Θ. Once we show Θ is continuous on Q, we
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can use Brouwer’s fixed point theorem to conclude that Θ has a fixed point. Continuity is
proved as follows:
Let qn = (T
n
1 , . . . , T
n
d ) → q = (T1, . . . , Td) in Q. It is easy to see from (4.7) that
Rqn(t) converges to Rq(t) if t /∈ {T1, . . . , Td}. Since τ ◦x/σ is non-atomic, bounded convergence
theorem implies for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R++ and any (positive) realization of c,
u(t, x;qn, c)→ u(t, x;q, c) as n→∞.
Once we have the pointwise convergence of u, we can then use (4.3) to obtain weak conver-
gence of L(τqn) to L(τq). To show TL(τqn )k → TL(τq)k , we consider three cases of k ∈ {1, . . . , d}.
Case (i). If rk ≤ π, then by our construction, TL(τqn )k = TL(τq)k = t0.
Case (ii). If π < rk ≤ Fτq(T ), then we observe from (4.3) that τq has strictly positive
density in (t0, T ). So the quantile function of L(τq) is continuous in (π, Fτq(T )]. Weak
convergence of L(τqn) to L(τq) then implies TL(τqn )k → TL(τq)k .
Case (iii). If rk > Fτq(T ), then T
L(τq)
k = ∆. By weak convergence of L(τqn) to L(τq) and
the continuity of Fτq at time T , we have that Fτqn (T )→ Fτq(T ). This implies rk > Fτqn (T )
and hence T
L(τqn )
k = ∆ for n sufficiently large.
Finally, we consider the case T = ∞. Assume first R ∈ RD. In this case, it is not
clear whether τµ has finite moments. In the worst case when the reward is constant after a
certain rank, τµ inherits the tail property of a Brownian motion first passage time, and thus,
has infinite mean. Hence, we cannot directly work with the space [t0,∞) using its standard
topology. Instead, we equip [t0,∞] with the order topology under which it is homeomorphic
to [0, 1]. For example, one can take the homeomorphism to be F¯ := E[Ft0+τ◦ξ/σ ] with the
convention that any c.d.f. maps ∞ to 1. With this choice of topology, [t0,∞] becomes
compact and metrizable. It follows that the space P([t0,∞]) is also compact for the topology
of weak convergence which can be assigned the corresponding 1-Wasserstein metric:
W1(µ, µ
′) := inf
{∫
[t0,∞]2
|F¯ (x)− F¯ (y)|dπ(x, y) : π ∈ P([t0,∞]2) with marginals µ and µ′
}
.
By Portmanteau theorem for Polish spaces, weak convergence of µk to µ in P([t0,∞]) still
implies the convergence of Fµk to Fµ at the continuity points of Fµ, although the topology
involved is slightly non-standard. Indeed, for any t ∈ [t0,∞], since [t0, t) is open and [t0, t]
is closed, we have lim infk µk([t0, t)) ≥ µ([t0, t)) and lim supk µk([t0, t]) ≤ µ([t0, t]). If Fµ is
continuous at t, then lim supk Fµk(t) ≤ Fµ(t) = Fµ(t−) ≤ lim infk Fµk(t−) ≤ lim infk Fµk(t).
When µ ∈ P([t0,∞)), which holds for any measure in the range of Φt0,π,m, weak con-
vergence of µn to µ in the usual sense implies weak convergence in P([t0,∞]), since any
bounded continuous function on [t0,∞] (equipped with the order topology) is also bounded
continuous on [t0,∞) (equipped with the standard topology). This means that, to show
W1(Φ
t0,π,m(µk),Φ
t,π0,m(µ)) → 0, pointwise convergence of Fµk to Fµ on [t0,∞) is still suffi-
cient as before. Thus, the proof from the case T <∞ remains valid.
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For the case R ∈ RS, we similarly identify Q = {(T1, . . . , Td) ∈ [t0,∞]d : T1 ≤ T2 ≤ · · · ≤
Td} with the convex, compact set Y := {(y1, . . . , yd) ∈ [0, 1]d : y1 ≤ y2 ≤ · · · ≤ yd} under
the homeomorphism F¯ : (T1, . . . , Td) 7→ (F¯ (T1), . . . , F¯ (Td)). Since the extended real line is
not a vector space, Schauder’s fixed point theorem does not directly apply to Q. However,
we can look for a fixed point of Ξ := F¯ ◦Θ ◦ F¯−1 in Y instead, where Θ is the original best
response mapping. Any fixed point y of Ξ induces a fixed point q = F¯−1(y) of Θ. Since F¯ is
a homeomorphism, Ξ is continuous if and only if Θ is continuous. The proof then proceeds
similarly as before.
4.2 Uniqueness of the fixed point
Denote byACTt0 the set of measures µ ∈ P(R+) with CDF Fµ that is absolutely continuous
on [t0, T ]∩ [t0,∞). The following monotonicity condition, which we will show is sufficient for
uniqueness, is in the same spirit as Lasry and Lions (2007) (also see (Bayraktar and Zhang,
2016, Section 3.2)).
Assumption 4.1. For any µ, µ′ ∈ ACTt0 such that Fµ(t0) = Fµ′(t0), we have∫ T
t0
(Rµ − Rµ′)(t)d(µ− µ′)(t) ≤ 0.
Proposition 4.1. Assumption 4.1 is satisfied if the function
h(t, x, y) :=
{
R(t,x)−R(t,y)
x−y
, t ∈ [t0, T ] ∩ [t0,∞), 0 ≤ x 6= y ≤ 1
∂
∂x
R(t, x) t ∈ [t0, T ] ∩ [t0,∞), 0 ≤ x = y ≤ 1
is well-defined, non-positive, increasing in t, x, y, and the functions R(t, Fµ(t)), h(t, Fµ(t), Fµ′(t))
are absolutely continuous on [t0, T ] ∩ [t0,∞) for any µ, µ ∈ ACTt0 . In particular, Assump-
tion 4.1 is satisfied for reward functions of the form R(t, r) = 1{t≤T}H(r)+1{t>T}R∞, where
H is a convex, decreasing, C2[0, 1] function, such that H(r) ≥ R∞ for all r.
Proof. Using integration by parts for absolutely continuous functions, we have∫ T
t0
(Rµ − Rµ′)(t)d(µ− µ′)(t)
= (Rµ(T )−Rµ′(T ))(Fµ(T )− Fµ′(T ))−
∫ T
t0
(Fµ − Fµ′)(t)d(Rµ − Rµ′)(t)
= (Fµ(T )− Fµ′(T ))2h(T, Fµ(T ), Fµ′(T ))−
∫ T
t0
(Fµ − Fµ′)(t)d [(Fµ − Fµ′)(t)h(t, Fµ(t), Fµ′(t))]
≤ −
∫ T
t0
(Fµ − Fµ′)(t) [(Fµ − Fµ′)(t)dh(t, Fµ(t), Fµ′(t)) + h(t, Fµ(t), Fµ′(t))d(Fµ − Fµ′)(t)]
= −
∫ T
t0
(Fµ − Fµ′)2(t)dh(t, Fµ(t), Fµ′(t))−
∫ T
t0
(Rµ −Rµ′)(t)d(µ− µ′)(t)
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where we have used Fµ(t0) = Fµ′(t0) and h ≤ 0 for the boundary terms. Re-arranging terms
and using the monotonicity of h(t, Fµ(t), Fµ′(t)), we get
2
∫ T
t0
(Rµ −Rµ′)(t)d(µ− µ′)(t) ≤ −
∫ T
t0
(Fµ − Fµ′)2(t)dh(t, Fµ(t), Fµ′(t)) ≤ 0.
Theorem 4.2. Under Assumption 4.1, Φt0,π,m has at most one fixed point.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of (Bayraktar and Zhang, 2016, Proposition 3.1). Suppose
µ and µ′ are two fixed points of Φt0,π,m. Then we obviously have Fµ(t0) = Fµ′(t0) = π.
Moreover, µ, µ′ ∈ ACTt0 by (4.2). Assumption 4.1 then implies that∫ T
t0
[Rµ(t)− Rµ′(t)]d(µ− µ′)(t) ≤ 0. (4.8)
Write v(t, x; c) := v(t, x;µ, c) and v′(t, x; c) := v(t, x;µ′, c). Let (θ, ξ, c) be a randomiza-
tion according to the initial condition (t0, π,m), and let X
µ, Xµ
′
, τµ, τµ′ be constructed as
in Section 4.1. Also define τ εµ and τ
ε
µ′ to be the first hitting time of level ε > 0. By Itoˆ’s
lemma and the PDE satisfied by v and v′, we have
E [Rµ(τµ)− Rµ′(τµ)]
= E
[
1{θ=1}(Rµ(t0)− Rµ′(t0))
]
+ E
[
1{θ=0}(v − v′)(τµ ∧ T,Xµτµ∧T ; c)
]
= π[Rµ(t0)− Rµ′(t0)] + lim
ε→0
E
[
1{θ=0}(v − v′)(τ εµ ∧ T,Xµτεµ∧T ; c)
]
= π[Rµ(t0)− Rµ′(t0)] + lim
ε→0
E
[
1{θ=0}
{
(v − v′)(t0, ξ; c) +
∫ τεµ∧T
t0
1
4c
(vx − v′x)2(t, Xµt ; c)dt
}]
= π[Rµ(t0)− Rµ′(t0)] + E
[
1{θ=0}
{
(v − v′)(t0, ξ; c) +
∫ τµ∧T
t0
1
4c
(vx − v′x)2(t, Xµt ; c)dt
}]
.
Using µ = Φt0,π,m(µ) = L(τµ) and Rµ(t0) = R(t0, Fµ(t0)) = R(t0, π) = R(t0, Fµ′(t0)) =
Rµ′(t0), we get∫ ∞
t0
[Rµ(t)−Rµ′(t)]dµ(t)
= E
[
1{θ=0}(v − v′)(t, ξ; c)
]
+ E
[
1{θ=0}
∫ τµ∧T
t0
1
4c
(vx − v′x)2(t, Xµt ; c)dt
] (4.9)
Exchanging the roles of µ and µ′ in (4.9) and adding the resulting equation to (4.9) yields∫ ∞
t0
[Rµ(t)− Rµ′(t)]d(µ− µ′)(t)
= E
[
1{θ=0}
4c
{∫ τµ∧T
t0
(vx − v′x)2(t, Xµt ; c)dt+
∫ τµ′∧T
t0
(v′x − vx)2(t, Xµ
′
t ; c)dt
}]
≥ 0.
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Since Rµ(t) = Rµ′(t) = R∞ for any t > T , the left hand side can be replaced by∫ T
t0
[Rµ(t)− Rµ′(t)]d(µ− µ′)(t)
which is non-positive by (4.8). So on the set {θ = 0}, we have
(vx − v′x)2(t, Xµt ; c)1{t0≤t<τµ∧T} = (v′x − vx)2(t, Xµ
′
t ; c)1{t0≤t<τµ′∧T} = 0 P × dt-a.e.
The first term being zero implies
vx(t, X
µ
t ; c)1{t0≤t<τµ∧T} = v
′
x(t, X
µ
t ; c)1{t0≤t<τµ∧T} P × dt-a.e.
By the uniqueness of the solution of the SDE (2.1), we have Xµ = Xµ
′
a.s. up to time
τµ ∧ T . Thus, on the set {τµ ≤ T}, we have τµ = τµ′ a.s. On the set {τµ > T}, we also have
τµ′ > T since X
µ′ coincides with Xµ up to time T , and consequently, τµ = τµ′ = ∆ by our
construction. In summary, we have proved that τµ = τµ′ a.s. and thus, µ = L(τµ) = L(τµ′) =
µ′.
4.3 Stability of the fixed point
How stable or sensitive is the equilibrium with respect to changes in the reward function?
This question is not only of interest in its own, but also provides the basis for numerical
computation of the mean field equilibrium (see Section 6.1). Specifically, the stability result
guarantees that the sequence of equilibria of discretized (mean field) games, if converging,
will converge weakly to an equilibrium of the original game.
Introduce a Lipschitz condition:
RDL := {R ∈ RD : ∃LG ∈ R s.t. |G(t, y1)−G(t, y2)| ≤ LG|y1 − y2| ∀t ∈ R+, y1, y2 ∈ R}.
We then have the following stability (continuity) result.
Theorem 4.3. Suppose {Rn(t, r) = G(t, Hn(r))} ⊆ RDL is a sequence of reward functions
which converges to R(t, r) = G(t, H(r)) ∈ RDL in the following sense:
‖Hn −H‖L1[0,1] → 0 as n→∞.
Let µn be a fixed point of the best response mapping Φ
t0,π,m
n associated with Rn (given by
Theorem 4.1). Then µn has a subsequence which converges weakly to a fixed point µ of the
best response mapping Φt0,π,m associated with R.
Proof. Assume first T <∞.
First, we construct a weak limit. Since each µn belongs to the compact space P(T), we
can extract a subsequence of µn which converges weakly to some µ. With a slight abuse of
notation, we still denote the convergent subsequence by µn.
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Next, from part (a) of the the proof of Theorem 4.1, we know Φt0,π,m is continuous
on (Df ,W1). It follows that µ˜n := Φt0,π,m(µn) converges in W1-metric and also weakly to
Φt0,π,m(µ).
The main task is to show the the c.d.f.s of µn = Φ
t0,π,m
n (µn) and of µ˜n = Φ
t0,π,m(µn) are
uniformly close for n large. More precisely, we claim that
‖Fµn − Fµ˜n‖∞ ≤ C‖Hn −H‖L1[0,1] (4.10)
for some constant C independent of n. Denote by un the transformed value function associ-
ated with the reward function Rn. The proof relies on the following two estimates:
E|un(t0, ξ;µn, c)− u(t0, ξ;µn, c)| ≤ C1‖Hn −H‖L1[0,1], (4.11)
E
∫ T
t0
|un(t, 0;µn, c)− u(t, 0;µn, c)|fτ◦
ξ/σ
(t− t0)dt ≤ C2‖Hn −H‖L1[0,1], (4.12)
where the constants C1 and C2 do not depend on n.
By (4.3) and (2.8), we know the p.d.f. of µn, denoted by fµn , is bounded from below in
(t0, T ) by f (defined in (4.6)). By (2.4), the Lipschitz continuity of G(t, ·), the assumption
that G(t, x) = R∞ for all t > T , and (4.6), we obtain
E [|un(t0, ξ;µn, c)− u(t0, ξ;µn, c)|]
≤ E
[
E
[∣∣∣∣∣exp
(
(Rn)µn(t0 + τ
◦
ξ/σ)
2cσ2
)
− exp
(
Rµn(t0 + τ
◦
ξ/σ)
2cσ2
)∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣ξ, c
]]
≤ E
[
LG
2cσ2
exp
(
R(0, 0)
2cσ2
)
E
[
1{t0+τ◦ξ/σ≤T}
∣∣Hn(Fµn(t0 + τ ◦ξ/σ))−H(Fµn(t0 + τ ◦ξ/σ))∣∣ ∣∣∣∣ξ, c]]
= E
[
LG
2cσ2
exp
(
R(0, 0)
2cσ2
)∫ T
t0
|Hn(Fµn(t))−H(Fµn(t))|
fτ◦
ξ/σ
(t− t0)
fµn(t)
dFµn(t)
]
≤ LG
2cσ2
exp
(
R(0, 0)
2cσ2
)∫ T
t0
|Hn(Fµn(t))−H(Fµn(t))|
Efτ◦
ξ/σ
(t− t0)
f(t)
dFµn(t)
≤ LG
2cσ2(1− π) exp
(
R(0, 0)
2cσ2
+
R(0, 0)− R∞
2cσ2
)∫ T
t0
|Hn(Fµn(t))−H(Fµn(t))| dFµn(t)
=
LG
2cσ2(1− π) exp
(
R(0, 0)
2cσ2
+
R(0, 0)−R∞
2cσ2
)∫ Fµn (T )
Fµn(t0)
|Hn(r)−H(r)| dr
≤ LG
2cσ2(1− π) exp
(
R(0, 0)
2cσ2
+
R(0, 0)− R∞
2cσ2
)
‖Hn −H‖L1[0,1]
41
This proves (4.11). Similarly,
E
∫ T
t0
|un(t, 0;µn, c)− u(t, 0;µn, c)|fτ◦
ξ/σ
(t− t0)dt
= E
∫ T
t0
∣∣∣∣exp((Rn)µn(t)2cσ2
)
− exp
(
Rµn(t)
2cσ2
)∣∣∣∣ fτ◦ξ/σ(t− t0)dt
≤ LG
2cσ2
exp
(
R(0, 0)
2cσ2
)∫ T
t0
|Hn(Fµn(t))−H(Fµn(t))|
Efτ◦
ξ/σ
(t− t0)
fµn(t)
dFµn(t)
≤ LG
2cσ2(1− π) exp
(
R(0, 0)
2cσ2
+
R(0, 0)−R∞
2cσ2
)∫ Fµn(T )
Fµn (t0)
|Hn(r)−H(r)| dr
≤ LG
2cσ2(1− π) exp
(
R(0, 0)
2cσ2
+
R(0, 0)−R∞
2cσ2
)
‖Hn −H‖L1[0,1],
which verifies (4.12). We are now ready to show (4.10). For t ≤ t0, Fµn(t) = Fµ˜n(t) trivially.
For t ∈ (t0, T ], using (4.2), (2.8), (4.11) and (4.12), we deduce that
|Fµn(t)− Fµ˜n(t)|
≤ (1− π)E
[∫ t
t0
∣∣∣∣ un(s, 0;µn, c)un(t0, ξ;µn, c) − u(s, 0;µn, c)u(t0, ξ;µn, c)
∣∣∣∣ fτ◦ξ/σ(s− t0)ds]
= (1− π)E
[∫ t
t0
∣∣∣∣un(s, 0;µn, c)u(t0, ξ;µn, c)− u(s, 0;µn, c)un(t0, ξ;µn, c)un(t0, ξ;µn, c)u(t0, ξ;µn, c)
∣∣∣∣ fτ◦ξ/σ(s− t0)ds]
≤ (1− π) exp
(
R(0, 0)
2cσ2
− R∞
cσ2
)
E
[
|u(t0, ξ;µn, c)− un(t0, ξ;µn, c)|
∫ t
t0
fτ◦
ξ/σ
(s− t0)ds
]
+ (1− π) exp
(−R∞
2cσ2
)
E
[∫ t
t0
|un(s, 0;µn, c)− u(s, 0;µn, c)| fτ◦
ξ/σ
(s− t0)ds
]
≤ (1− π)
{
C1 exp
(
R(0, 0)
2cσ2
− R∞
cσ2
)
+ C2 exp
(−R∞
2cσ2
)}
‖Hn −H‖L1[0,1].
When T <∞, both Fµn and Fµ˜n stay constant after time T until time ∆ where they jump
to one. So the maximum of |Fµn − Fµ˜n | occurs on [t0, T ] and an upper bound is given by
(4.10).
Finally, we have all the pieces to show µ is a fixed point of Φt0,π,m. Since µ˜n converges
weakly to Φt0,π,m(µ) and |Fµn −Fµ˜n | converges to zero uniformly, we know µn also converges
to Φt0,π,m(µ) weakly. By uniqueness of the weak limit, we must have Φt0,π,m(µ) = µ.
For T =∞, we use the compactification of P([t0,∞]) as in the proof of Theorem 4.1.
4.4 Approximate equilibrium of the N-player game
We want to see when we can approximate a game with finitely many players with the
game with infinitely many players. Our results will be derived for the reward functions that
42
are Ho¨lder continuous in the rank variable. For α ∈ (0, 1], define
RCα := {R ∈ R : ∃Lα ∈ R s.t. |R(t, r1)−R(t, r2)| ≤ Lα|r1−r2|α ∀t ∈ R+, r1, r2 ∈ R} ⊆ RD.
For simplicity of the presentation, we consider only a freshly started tournament, that is,
t0 = 0, and π = 0.
The N -player system is given by
Xaii,t = xi −
∫ t
0
ai,sds+ σBi,t, i = 1, . . . , N,
where B1, . . . , BN are independent Brownian motions, and a = (a1, . . . , aN) is a vector
of admissible actions, meaning that each ai is non-negative and progressively measurable
with respect to the filtration of B1, . . . , BN , and yields a unique strong solution X
ai
i up to
τaii := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xaii,t = 0}, and if τaii is non-atomic.
Let µ¯N,a = 1
N
∑N
i=1 δτaii be the empirical distribution of the completion time.
Definition 4.1. An admissible action vector a = (a1, . . . , aN) is called an ǫ-Nash equilibrium
action of the N-player game if for any i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and any admissible control β, we have
E
[
Rµ¯N,a(τ
ai
i )−
∫ τaii ∧T
0
cia
2
i,tdt
]
+ ǫ ≥ E
[
R
µ¯
N,ai
β
(τβi )−
∫ τβi ∧T
0
ciβ
2
t dt
]
where aiβ = (a1, . . . , ai−1, β, ai+1, . . . , aN).
We have the following approximation result.
Theorem 4.4. Assume R ∈ RCα for some α ∈ (0, 1] and (xi, ci), i = 1, . . . , N are i.i.d.
samples from m. For any fixed point µ of Φ0,0,m, the vector a¯ = (a¯1, . . . , a¯N) with
a¯i,t := −(2ci)−1vx(t, X a¯ii,t;µ, ci)1{t<τ a¯ii }, i = 1, . . . , N
is an O(N−α/2)-Nash equilibrium action of the N-player game, as N →∞.
Proof. Let µ and a¯i,t be defined as in the theorem statement. To simplify notation, we omit
the superscript of any state process Xi and its first passage time τi if it is controlled by the
optimal Markovian feedback strategy −(2ci)−1vx(t, x;µ, ci). Fix an initial position x and
cost c. Let
V (x, c) := v(0, x;µ, c) = E
[
Rµ(τ
x,c)−
∫ τx,c∧T
0
1
4c
v2x(t, X
x,c
t ;µ, c)dt
]
be the value of the game with infinitely many players, where
dXx,ct = −
vx(t, X
x,c
t ;µ, c)
2c
1{t<τx,c}dt+ σdBt, X
x,c
0 = x
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and τx,c is the first passage time of Xx,c to level zero. Since Xi is an identical copy of X
xi,ci,
we have
V (xi, ci) = E
[
Rµ(τi)−
∫ τi∧T
0
1
4ci
v2x(t, Xi,t;µ, c)dt
]
= E
[
Rµ(τi)−
∫ τi∧T
0
cia¯
2
i,tdt
]
.
Let
µ¯N :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
δτi
be the empirical distribution of the completion time, and
JNi : = E
[
Rµ¯N (τi)−
∫ τi∧T
0
cia¯
2
i,tdt
]
be the net gain of player i in an N -player game when everybody uses the candidate approx-
imate Nash equilibrium a¯. We first show that JNi and V (xi, ci) are close. By the α-Ho¨lder
continuity of R, we have
V (xi, ci)− JNi = E
[
(Rµ(τi)−Rµ¯N (τi))
] ≤ Lα [‖Fµ¯N − Fµε‖α∞]
Let q(· ; x, c) be the distribution of τx,c. Since τi has q(· ; xi, ci) as its distribution and
(xi, ci) hasm as its distribution, we can treat µ¯
N as the empirical distribution of i.i.d. samples
from q ⊗m = µ.16 By Dvoretzky-Kiefer-Wolfowitz inequality, we have
P
(‖Fµ¯N − Fµ‖∞ > z) ≤ 2e−2Nz2 ∀ z > 0.
It follows that
V (xi, ci)− JNi ≤ LαE[‖Fµ¯N − Fµ‖α∞] = Lα
∫ ∞
0
P
(‖Fµ¯N − Fµ‖α∞ > z) dz
≤ Lα
∫ ∞
0
2e−2Nz
2/α
dz =
2Lα
Nα/2
∫ ∞
0
e−2y
2/α
dy = O(N−α/2) as N →∞.
Next, consider the system where player i makes a unilateral deviation from the candi-
date approximate Nash equilibrium a¯; say, he chooses an admissible control β. Denote his
controlled state process by Xβi , and the state processes of all other players by Xj as before
for j 6= i. Let
ν¯N :=
1
N
(δτβi
+
∑
j 6=i
δτj )
be the corresponding empirical measure of the completion times, and
JN,βi := E
[
Rν¯N (τ
β
i )−
∫ τβi ∧T
0
ciβ
2
t dt
]
16Being a fixed point of Φ0,0,m, µ is supported on [0,∆]. Here by a slight abuse of notation, we identify µ
with q ⊗m ∈ P [0,∞) without changing the action a¯.
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be the corresponding net gain for player i. We have
JN,βi − V (xi, ci)
= E
[
Rν¯N (τ
β
i )−
∫ τβi ∧T
0
ciβ
2
t dt
]
− E
[
Rµ(τi)−
∫ τi∧T
0
cia¯
2
i,tdt
]
= E
[
Rν¯N (τ
β
i )− Rµ(τβi )
]
+ E
[
Rµ(τ
β
i )−
∫ τβi ∧T
0
ciβ
2
t dt
]
− E
[
Rµ(τi)−
∫ τi∧T
0
cia¯
2
i,tdt
]
≤ E
[
Rν¯N (τ
β
i )−Rµ(τβi )
]
,
where we have used the optimality of a¯i for the i-th player’s problem (in response to µ) in
the last step.17 Let
ν¯N−i :=
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
δτj .
ν¯N−i is the empirical distribution of (N − 1) i.i.d. samples from the distribution µ. Similar to
how we estimated V (xi, ci)− JNi , we have
JN,βi − V (xi, ci) ≤ LαE[|Fν¯N (τβi )− Fµ(τβi )|α]
= LαE
[∣∣∣∣ 1N (1− Fµ(τβi ))+ N − 1N (Fν¯N−i(τβi )− Fµ(τβi ))
∣∣∣∣α]
≤ LαE
[(
1
N
+
N − 1
N
‖Fν¯N
−i
− Fµ‖∞
)α]
≤ Lα
(
1
N
+
N − 1
N
E‖Fν¯N
−i
− Fµ‖∞
)α
= O(N−α/2) as N →∞.
Combining the two estimates, we obtain
JN,βi − JNi = JN,βi − V (xi, ci) + (V (xi, ci)− JNi ) ≤ O(N−α/2) as N →∞.
This shows a¯ is an O(N−α/2)-Nash equilibrium action.
Remark 4.1. For reward functions that are merely continuous in the rank variable, we still
have convergence of the approximation, but we do not know the convergence rate.
5 A case with heterogeneous players
We end our discussion with a numerically computed example with heterogeneous agents,
assuming R ∈ R is of the form (3.1). The numerical method is decribed in Appendix. We
consider players that differ in the initial location and cost, with x0 ∈ {1, 2} and c ∈ {1, 4}.
Other model inputs are fixed to be T = 1, σ = 0.25 and R(t, r) = 1{t≤T}15(1− r)2. Denote
17By Remark 2.2, a¯i is optimal in the filtration of B1, . . . , BN .
45
by β the population terminal completion rate and by βx the terminal completion rate of the
players of type x relative to its initial weight. Similarly, Vx refers to the game value for a
player of type x. We define the total welfare as
Total welfare =
∫
V (x0, c)dm(x0, c).
Let us call “disadvantaged” (DA) the players who start from a larger distance, or who have
a higher cost of effort. Analogously for “advantaged” (AD) players.
Case m β βAD βDA VAD VDA Total welfare
0 δ(1,1) 75.9% 75.9% - 0.178 - 0.178
1 4
5
δ(1,1) +
1
5
δ(2,1) 73.8% 92.2% 0% 0.319 0 0.255
2 3
5
δ(1,1) +
2
5
δ(2,1) 60% 100% 0% 1.701 0 1.020
3 2
5
δ(1,1) +
3
5
δ(2,1) 49.8% 100% 16.4% 4.276 0.022 1.724
4 1
5
δ(1,1) +
4
5
δ(2,1) 49.8% 100% 37.3% 7.338 0.058 1.514
5 δ(2,1) 49.8% - 49.8% - 0.086 0.086
6 4
5
δ(1,1) +
1
5
δ(1,4) 73.8% 92.2% 0.1% 0.319 0 0.255
7 3
5
δ(1,1) +
2
5
δ(1,4) 60.4% 100% 0.9% 1.675 0.005 1.007
8 2
5
δ(1,1) +
3
5
δ(1,4) 51.9% 100% 19.8% 4.030 0.110 1.678
9 1
5
δ(1,1) +
4
5
δ(1,4) 51.8% 100% 39.8% 7.091 0.253 1.621
10 δ(1,4) 51.8% - 51.8% - 0.365 0.365
Table 2: Equilibrium completion rates and game values under different population compo-
sition.
Table 2 shows that for those parameters, the following happens:
• As the fraction of DA players in the population increases, the population completion
rate decreases, but the completion rates of the DA group and of the AD group both
increase. That is, the aggregate percentage of completions is lower because more of the
population is disadvantaged, and not because of working less hard. In fact, both the
value of DA players and the value of AD players go up with the population fraction
of DA players. This is because DA players find it more advantageous to put in higher
effort when the fraction of AD players is lower, due to weaker competition, so that a
higher percentage of DA players completes the task and enjoys a higher value.
• The aggregate welfare is not monotone in the percentage of DA players: it goes up with
the fraction of DA players only in the lower and mid range of the DA fraction, unlike
the groups’ welfare that always go up. When the fraction of DA players becomes very
high, the total population welfare starts decreasing. This is the result of two conflicting
forces: quality (higher individual value) versus quantity (fewer AD individuals).
These results support two (not very surprising) empirical predictions: (i) in low-growth
industries, or in non-profit institutions we should not see tournament-based compensation,
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Figure 7: Effort function in an equilibrium formed by 80% low-cost players and 20% high-
cost players (top two panels) and 20% low-cost players and 80% high-cost players (bottom
two panels). Everyone starts at x0 = 1.
especially when they have a high percentage of high-skilled employees; (ii) in undeveloped
countries with large differences in access to good education, those with less access would give
up early.
To recap, a more efficient society (more AD workers) has a higher productivity (larger
β) and may have a higher total welfare, but it makes, in this example, the individuals worse
off, because the efficient workers tend to work too hard and the inefficient workers tend to
work too little.
Figure 7 shows the equilibrium effort corresponding to Cases 6 and 9 in Table 2, varying
the fraction of low cost vs high cost players. (Other cases lead to similar observations.)
Comparing the effort level between the left two panels and the right two panels, we see that
the low-cost players exert higher effort than the high-cost players. Their effort region is also
larger. On the other hand, players also tend to play to their opponents’ level. A comparison
of the top left panel with the bottom left panel demonstrates that the effort peak of AD
players is significantly lower when they face weaker competition. Similarly, DA players tend
to raise their effort when they face stronger competition until the competition gets too strong
for them to keep up.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Numerical method
When the players are heterogeneous, that is, when m is not degenerate, there is generally
no explicit characterization of the equilibrium. Instead, we sketch in this section how to
numerically solve the fixed point equation
Fµ(t) = E
[∫ t
0
u(z, 0;µ, c)
u(0, ξ;µ, c)
fτ◦
ξ/σ
(z)dz
]
, t ∈ [0, T ] (6.1)
by discretizing the rank space, which is equivalent to discretizing the purely rank-based
reward function.18 From the stability result (Theorem 4.3), we know that the sequence
of Nash equilibria of the discretized games, if converging, will converge weakly to a Nash
equilibrium of the original game. Thus, we focus on piecewise constant reward functions:
R(t, r) = 1{t≤T}
[
d∑
k=1
Rk1[rk−1,rk)(r) +Rd+11[rd,1]
]
+ 1{t>T}R∞
where 0 = r0 < r1 < · · · < rd < 1 is a finite partition of the rank space, and R1 ≥
R2 ≥ · · ·Rd+1 ≥ R∞. Since such a reward function lies in RD ∩ RS, we already know from
Section 4.1 that a Nash equilibrium exists, and that each equilibrium distribution µ can be
represented by a vector (T µ1 , . . . , T
µ
d ), where T
µ
k is the (rk)-quantile of µ. As before, we set
T µ0 := 0, T
µ
d+1 := ∆.
Using the piecewise constant structure of Rµ(t), for a freshly started game with (t0, π) =
(0, 0), the fixed point equation for the c.d.f of µ becomes
Fµ(t) = E
∑d+1k=1 exp ( Rk2cσ2 )
(
Fτ◦
ξ/σ
(T µk ∧ t)− Fτ◦ξ/σ(T
µ
k−1 ∧ t)
)
u(0, ξ;µ, c)
 , t ≤ T, (6.2)
where
u(0, ξ;µ, c) =
d+1∑
k=1
exp
(
Rk
2cσ2
)(
Fτ◦
ξ/σ
(T µk ∧ T )− Fτ◦ξ/σ(T
µ
k−1 ∧ T )
)
+exp
(
R∞
2cσ2
)(
1− Fτ◦
ξ/σ
(T )
)
.
In particular, for each T µj ≤ T , we have
rj = Fµ(T
µ
j ) = E
∑jk=1 exp ( Rk2cσ2 )
(
Fτ◦
ξ/σ
(T µk )− Fτ◦ξ/σ(T
µ
k−1)
)
u(0, ξ;µ, c)
 .
18There is an advantage of discretizing the rank variable instead of time variable: when T is large, a fine
discretization of [0, T ] may result in a high computational burden. In contrast, the rank space [0, 1] remains
fixed.
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To describe the numerical algorithm, we introduce the quantity19
AT := E
 exp ( R12cσ2 )Fτ◦ξ/σ(T )
exp
(
R1
2cσ2
)
Fτ◦
ξ/σ
(T ) + exp
(
R∞
2cσ2
) (
1− Fτ◦
ξ/σ
(T )
)
 . (6.3)
We consider two cases.
Case 1. If r1 > AT , then we must have T
µ
1 > T , otherwise we get a contradiction:
r1 > AT ≥ E
 exp ( R12cσ2 )Fτ◦ξ/σ(T µ1 )
exp
(
R1
2cσ2
)
Fτ◦
ξ/σ
(T µ1 ) + exp
(
R∞
2cσ2
) (
1− Fτ◦
ξ/σ
(T )
)

≥ E
[
exp
(
R1
2cσ2
)
Fτ◦
ξ/σ
(T µ1 )
u(0, ξ;µ, c)
]
= r1.
In this case, (∆, . . . ,∆) is the unique equilibrium quantile, that is, no one finishes the project.
Case 2. If r1 ≤ AT , then we must have T µ1 ≤ T , since otherwise T µk = ∆ for all
k = 1, . . . , d+ 1 and Fµ(T ) = AT ≥ r1, yielding a contradiction: T ≥ T µ1 = ∆. In this case,
let k0 = max{k : T µk ≤ T} ∈ {1, . . . , d}. Then, we write u as
u(0, ξ;T µ[1:k0], c) =
k0∑
k=1
exp
(
Rk
2cσ2
)(
Fτ◦
ξ/σ
(T µk )− Fτ◦ξ/σ(T
µ
k−1)
)
+ exp
(
Rk0+1
2cσ2
)(
Fτ◦
ξ/σ
(T )− Fτ◦
ξ/σ
(T µk0)
)
+ exp
(
R∞
2cσ2
)(
1− Fτ◦
ξ/σ
(T )
)
=
k0∑
k=1
(
exp
(
Rk
2cσ2
)
− exp
(
Rk+1
2cσ2
))
Fτ◦
ξ/σ
(T µk )
+ exp
(
Rk0+1
2cσ2
)
Fτ◦
ξ/σ
(T ) + exp
(
R∞
2cσ2
)(
1− Fτ◦
ξ/σ
(T )
)
.
(6.4)
Here, we have replaced µ by T µ[1:k0] to indicate that u depends on µ only through the first k0
quantiles. The fixed point equations can be rewritten then as
rk − rk−1 = E
exp ( Rk2cσ2 )
(
Fτ◦
ξ/σ
(T µk )− Fτ◦ξ/σ(T
µ
k−1)
)
u(0, ξ;T µ[1:k0], c)
 , k = 1, . . . , k0. (6.5)
This is a system of nonlinear equations in T µ1 , . . . , T
µ
k0
, where k0 is determined by the condition
that T µk0 ≤ T < T µk0+1, or equivalently, 0 ≤ Fµ(T ) − Fµ(T µk0) < rk0+1 − rk0 (where we set
rd+1 := 1). By (6.2), this is equivalent to
0 ≤ E
exp
(
Rk0+1
2cσ2
)(
Fτ◦
ξ/σ
(T )− Fτ◦
ξ/σ
(T µk0)
)
u(0, ξ;T µ[1:k0], c)
 < rk0+1 − rk0. (6.6)
19Note that AT does not depend on µ, thus can be computed a priori.
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The procedure can be summarized as follows:
– If T <∞, compute AT defined by (6.3).
• If AT < r1, then the unique equilibrium quantile vector is given by (∆, . . . ,∆).
• If AT ≥ r1, solve the nonlinear system (6.5) for (T µ1 , . . . , T µk0), where u is given
by (6.4), and k0 is determined by (6.6). The equilibrium quantile vector is given
by (T µ1 , . . . , T
µ
k0
,∆, . . . ,∆).
– If T =∞, solve (6.4) and (6.5) with k0 = d.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 3.1
(i) Let ψ(y) := φ−1(y/(1 − y)) where φ is defined in (3.8). We have β = ψ(Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )).
Since y 7→ ψ(y) is strictly increasing, the strictly monotonicity of β in T and x0 follows
from that of Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T ). Now, fix T and x0. Suppose c1 ≤ c2, then φ(r; c1) ≤ φ(r, c2) for all
r ∈ [0, 1], and thus
φ(β(c1); c1) =
Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )
1− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )
= φ(β(c2); c2) ≥ φ(β(c2); c1).
Since φ(·; c1) is increasing, we get β(c1) ≥ β(c2). All the limits follow from straightforward
computations using (3.3) and (3.4).
(ii) Recall (3.4):
(1− β)Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )
1− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )
=
∫ β
0
exp
(
R∞ −H(z)
2cσ2
)
dz. (6.7)
Let 0 < T1 ≤ T2 <∞. Since β(T1) ≤ β(T2) and H ≥ R∞, we have
β(T2)− β(T1) ≥
∫ β(T2)
β(T1)
exp
(
R∞ −H(z)
2cσ2
)
dz
=
(1− β(T2))Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T2)
1− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T2)
−
(1− β(T1))Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T1)
1− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T1)
=
(
Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T2)− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T1)
)
(1− β(T2))(
1− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T2)
)(
1− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T1)
) + (β(T1)− β(T2)) Fτ◦x0/σ(T1)
1− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T1)
.
This implies
β(T2)− β(T1) ≥
(
Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T2)− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T1)
)
(1− β(T2))(
1− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T2)
) .
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Let ζ := (1− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T ))/(1− β). We then have
ζ(T2)− ζ(T1) =
(
1− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T2)
)
(β(T2)− β(T1))− (1− β(T2))
(
Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T2)− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T1)
)
(1− β(T2))(1− β(T1)) ≥ 0.
It follows that ζ , and hence V = R∞ + 2cσ
2 ln ζ , is increasing in T . As T → 0, we have
β → 0, ζ → 1 and V → R∞. As T → ∞, we have β → 1, ζ →
(∫ 1
0
exp
(
R∞−H(z)
2cσ2
))−1
(by
(6.7)) and V → V∞.
Similarly, let x1 ≤ x2, (6.7), together with β(x1) ≥ β(x2), implies
β(x1)− β(x2) ≥
(
Fτ◦
x1/σ
(T )− Fτ◦
x2/σ
(T )
)
(1− β(x2))(
1− Fτ◦
x2/σ
(T )
) ,
and
ζ(x1)− ζ(x2) =
(
1− Fτ◦
x2/σ
(T )
)
(β(x1)− β(x2))− (1− β(x2))
(
Fτ◦
x1/σ
(T )− Fτ◦
x2/σ
(T )
)
(1− β(x2))(1− β(x1)) ≥ 0.
Thus, ζ and V are decreasing in x0. As x0 → 0, we have β → 1, ζ →
(∫ 1
0
exp
(
R∞−H(z)
2cσ2
))−1
and V → V∞. As x0 →∞, we have β → 0, ζ → 1 and V → R∞.
(iii) Independence of x0 is direct from (3.7). Differentiating (3.7) with respect to c, we
get
∂V∞
∂c
=
−2σ2 ∫ 1
0
exp
(
−H(z)
2cσ2
)
dz ln
(∫ 1
0
exp
(
−H(z)
2cσ2
)
dz
)
− 2cσ2 ∫ 1
0
exp
(
−H(z)
2cσ2
)
H(z)
2c2σ2
dz∫ 1
0
exp
(
−H(z)
2cσ2
)
dz
=
−2σ2 ∫ 1
0
exp
(
−H(z)
2cσ2
){
ln
(∫ 1
0
exp
(
−H(r)
2cσ2
)
dr
)
+ H(z)
2cσ2
}
dz∫ 1
0
exp
(
−H(z)
2cσ2
)
dz
=
−2σ2 ∫ 1
0
h(z) ln
( ∫
1
0
h(r)dr
h(z)
)
dz∫ 1
0
h(z)dz
, where h(z) = exp
(
−H(z)
2cσ2
)
.
Using ln x ≤ x− 1 for all x > 0, we have∫ 1
0
h(z) ln
(∫ 1
0
h(r)dr
h(z)
)
dz ≤
∫ 1
0
h(z)
(∫ 1
0
h(r)dr
h(z)
− 1
)
dz = 0.
It follows that ∂V∞/∂c ≥ 0. To compute the limit in c, we first observe that
H(1−) ≤ V∞ ≤ EH(Fµ(τ)) =
∫ ∞
0
H(Fµ(t))dµ(t) =
∫ 1
0
H(r)dr.
51
So limc→0 V∞ and limc→∞ V∞ exist. To compute limc→0 V∞, we fix ε > 0. There exists a
δ > 0 (depending on ε) such that H(z) < H(1−) + ε for all z ∈ (1− δ, 1). We have
H(1−) ≤ lim
c→0
V∞ = H(1−)− lim
c→0
2cσ2 ln
(∫ 1
0
exp
(
H(1−)−H(z)
2cσ2
)
dz
)
≤ H(1−)− lim
c→0
2cσ2 ln
(∫ 1
1−δ
exp
( −ε
2cσ2
)
dz
)
= H(1−)− lim
c→0
2cσ2
(
ln δ − ε
2cσ2
)
= H(1−) + ε.
Since ε is arbitrary, we conclude that limc→0 V∞ = H(1−). To compute limc→∞ V∞, we use
L’Hoˆpital’s rule:
lim
c→∞
V∞ = lim
c→∞
−2cσ2 ln
(∫ 1
0
exp
(−H(z)
2cσ2
)
dz
)
= lim
c→∞
∫ 1
0
exp
(
−H(z)
2cσ2
)
H(z)dz∫ 1
0
exp
(
−H(z)
2cσ2
)
dz
=
∫ 1
0
H(z)dz.
(iv) It is obvious from (3.7) that V∞(H1) ≥ V∞(H2) if H1 ≥ H2. When T < ∞ and
H1 − R1,∞ ≥ H2 − R2,∞, we have φ(r;R1) ≤ φ(r;R2) (φ is defined in (3.8)), which implies
φ(β(R1);R1) = φ(β(R2);R2) ≥ φ(β(R2);R1). Since φ(·;R1) is increasing, we must have
β(R1) ≥ β(R2), and consequently, V (R1)− R1,∞ ≥ V (R2)− R2,∞ by (3.5).
6.3 Proofs of Theorems 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6
We first solve an auxiliary problem. Define
J (h) :=
∫ α
0
h(r)dr, K(h) :=
∫ α
0
− ln h(r)dr. (6.8)
and
h :=
{
h : [0, α]→ R : h is increasing, 0 < h ≤ exp
(
− R∞
2cσ2
)
,K(h) ≤ K − R∞(1− α)
2cσ2
}
.
(6.9)
Lemma 6.1. Let α ∈ (0, 1] and K ≥ R∞. Then infh∈h J (h) is uniquely attained (up to a.e.
equivalence) at
h∗ ≡ exp
(
−K − R∞(1− α)
2αcσ2
)
.
Proof. We first show uniqueness. Suppose h1, h2 ∈ h both minimize J . Then, since J is
linear and h is convex, hε := (1 − ε)h1 + εh2 is optimal for any ε ∈ [0, 1]. Note that any
optimizer h necessarily satisfies
K(h) = K − R∞(1− α)
2cσ2
,
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otherwise we can find λ ∈ (0, 1) such that λh ∈ h and J (λh) < J (h). This implies
K(hε) = (1 − ε)K(h1) + εK(h2) for any ε ∈ [0, 1]. However, by the strict convexity of
z 7→ − ln z (and thus of K), this can only happen when h1 = h2 a.e. on [0, α].
Next, we show h∗ is an optimizer. Let h ∈ h be arbitrary. We have by Jensen’s inequality
that
− 1
α
K(h) = 1
α
∫ α
0
ln h(r)dr ≤ ln
(
1
α
∫ α
0
h(r)dr
)
.
This implies
J (h) ≥ α exp
(
− 1
α
K(h)
)
≥ α exp
(
−K − R∞(1− α)
2αcσ2
)
= J (h∗).
Proof of Theorem 3.4. By Theorem 3.1(ii), we have
Tα(H) = F
−1
τ◦
x0/σ
∫ α0 exp
(
−H(r)
2cσ2
)
dr∫ 1
0
exp
(
−H(r)
2cσ2
)
dr
 .
First of all, it is clear from the above expression that one should only pay R∞ beyond rank
α, because H1[0,α] + R∞1(α,1] performs no worse than H . Assuming H = R∞ on (α, 1], we
further let h(r) := exp
(
−H(r)
2cσ2
)
and write
Tα(H) = F
−1
τ◦
x0/σ
( ∫ α
0
h(r)dr∫ α
0
h(r)dr + (1− α) exp (− R∞
2cσ2
)) .
Then, to minimize Tα(H), it suffices to minimize J (h). Moreover, the feasibility constraint
H ∈ H precisely translates to h ∈ h, under the assumption thatH = R∞ on (α, 1]. Thus, the
solution to our minimum quantile problem is in one-to-one correspondence to the solution
to our auxiliary problem, given by Lemma 6.1. All the statements of the theorem can now
be derived in a straightforward manner.
Proof of Theorem 3.5. By Theorem 3.1(i), we have
Tα(H ;T ) =
F−1τ◦x0/σ
(
1−Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )
1−β(H)
∫ α
0
exp
(
R∞−H(r)
2cσ2
)
dr
)
≤ T, α ≤ β(H),
∆, α > β(H),
where β(H) = FET (H)(T ) ∈ (0, 1) is the unique solution of
Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )
1− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )
=
1
1− z
∫ z
0
exp
(
R∞ −H(r)
2cσ2
)
dr = φ(z;H).
CLAIM: The optimal value does not change if we restrict ourselves to reward function
H which satisfies H(r) = R∞ for all r > α.
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To prove the claim, let H ∈ HαT and define Hˆ := H1[0,α] + R∞1(α,1]. We first check the
feasibility of Hˆ. Since φ(β(Hˆ); Hˆ) = φ(β(H);H) ≤ φ(β(H); Hˆ) and φ(z; Hˆ) is increasing,
we must have β(Hˆ) ≤ β(H). Using this, together with H ≥ Hˆ ≥ R∞, we get∫ β(Hˆ)
0
Hˆ(r)dr + (1− β(Hˆ))R∞ ≤
∫ β(H)
0
H(r)dr + (1− β(H))R∞ ≤ K.
Thus, Hˆ also satisfies the budget constraint. Since β(H) ≥ α, we have by the monotonicity
of φ that
φ(β(Hˆ); Hˆ) = φ(β(H);H) ≥ φ(α;H) = φ(α; Hˆ)
and thus, β(Hˆ) ≥ α. So we conclude that Hˆ ∈ HαT . Next, we have
Fτ◦
x0/σ
(Tα(Hˆ ;T )) =
1− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )
1− β(Hˆ)
∫ α
0
exp
(
R∞ − Hˆ(r)
2cσ2
)
dr
=
1− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )
1− β(Hˆ)
∫ α
0
exp
(
R∞ −H(r)
2cσ2
)
dr
≤
1− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )
1− β(H)
∫ α
0
exp
(
R∞ −H(r)
2cσ2
)
dr = Fτ◦
x0/σ
(Tα(H ;T )),
which is equivalent to Tα(Hˆ ;T ) ≤ Tα(H ;T ), and the claim has been verified.
Its immediate consequence is that if β(H) ≥ α and H(r) = R∞ for all r > α, then∫ β(H)
0
H(r)dr + (1− β(H))R∞ =
∫ 1
0
H(r)dr,
which implies
HαT ∩ {H|(α,1] ≡ R∞} = H ∩ {β(H) ≥ α} ∩ {H|(α,1] ≡ R∞}.
Thus, we can work with the simpler feasible set H instead of the equilibrium-dependent HαT .
As in the T = ∞ case, we let h(r) := exp
(
−H(r)
2cσ2
)
. In view of the claim above, we can
set h(r) ≡ exp (− R∞
2cσ2
)
for r ∈ (α, 1] and only search for the optimal h on [0, α]. With a
slight abuse of notation, we also use β(h) to denote the unique solution z in (0, 1) of
CT :=
Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )
1− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )
=
1
1− z
(∫ z∧α
0
exp
(
R∞
2cσ2
)
h(r)dr + (z − z ∧ α)
)
. (6.10)
The feasibility condition translates to h ∈ hT := h ∩ {β(h) ≥ α} where h is defined in (6.9).
Equation (6.10) implies that β(h) ≥ α if and only if
J (h) =
∫ α
0
h(r)dr ≤ CT (1− α) exp
(
− R∞
2cσ2
)
.
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By Lemma 6.1,
inf
h∈h
J (h) = J (h∗) = α exp
(
−K − (1− α)R∞
2αcσ2
)
.
Therefore, we arrived at the following feasibility criteria:
hT 6= ∅ ⇐⇒ β(h∗) ≥ α⇐⇒ J (h∗) ≤ CT (1− α) exp
(
− R∞
2cσ2
)
⇐⇒ T ≥ F−1τ◦
x0/σ
(
α
α + (1− α) exp (K−R∞
2αcσ2
)) = T ∗α.
If hT = ∅, then there is no feasible reward scheme which attains, in equilibrium, the desired
completion rate of α by time T . Suppose h ∈ hT 6= ∅. Then
Fτ◦
x0/σ
(Tα(H ;T )) =
(
1− Fτ◦
x0/σ
(T )
)
exp
(
R∞
2cσ2
) ∫ α
0
h(r)dr
1− β(h) .
Thus, to minimize Tα(H ;T ), we only need to minimize
L(h) := J (h)
1− β(h) exp
(
R∞
2cσ2
)
, h ∈ hT .
From (6.10), we also obtain
β(h) =
CT + α− exp
(
R∞
2cσ2
)J (h)
1 + CT
, h ∈ hT .
It follows that
L(h) = J (h)
1− α + exp ( R∞
2cσ2
)J (h) , h ∈ hT .
Hence, to minimize L(h), it suffices to minimize J (h) over h ∈ hT . Note that when hT 6= ∅,
we have β(h∗) ≥ α and thus, h∗ ∈ hT . This implies h∗ = argminh∈h J (h) is also the (unique)
optimizer of infh∈hT J (h). The optimal H∗ and T ∗α(T ) are then the one corresponding to h∗.
As in the case T = ∞, all the statements of the theorem but the last two can now be
derived in a straightforward manner. For the last two, setting T ∗α = T yields the minimum
budget and the maximum terminal completion rate.
Proof of Theorem 3.6. (i) By (3.7), maximizing V∞ over H is equivalent to minimizing
J (h) = ∫ 1
0
h(z)dz over h (defined in (6.9)) with α = 1. By Lemma 6.1, argminh∈h J (h) =
h∗ ≡ exp (−K/(2cσ2)). It follows that H∗ = argmaxH∈H V∞(H) = −2cσ2 ln h∗ ≡ K and
V∞(H
∗) = K.
(ii) By (3.5) and Proposition 3.2, maximizing the welfare or the expected total effort is
equivalent to maximizing the terminal completion rate, which we have solved in Theorem 3.5.
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